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ABSTRACT
This thesis has attempted an analysis of the foreign 
policy of the East African states - Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda. Probably raoreso than in the case of older esta­
blished states, their foreign policy is an extension of 
domestic,policies to the international scene. National 
survival, preservation of independence and the achieve­
ment of better living standards for the generally poor 
population are the important factors that influence the 
decision-makers in their choice of foreign policy orien­
tations.
After Chapter one which constitutes a general back­
ground to this study, Chapter two is designed to provide 
factual knowledge that could enable the reader to develop 
a degree of insight into the tasks facing emerging states 
striding towards political modernization and rapid socio­
economic development. In Chapter three, we are exposed 
to the dilemmas of ideology and the ambiguities inherent 
in the concept of Pan-Africanism. The initial attempts 
of the leaders to federate East Africa were founded on 
the appeals of Pan-Africanism, a common heritage and 
certain geopolitical factors but events soon proved to 
them that not even this complex of factors would necessa­
rily lead to political integration.
Ill
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The Pan-Africanist theme also extended to Chapter 
four where specific inter-governmental problems have been 
considered. In their border disputes and territorial 
claims, Kenya and Tanzania readily invoked the O.A.U. 
articles to push their cases against Somalia and Malawi 
respectively. On the other hand, Tanzania refused to be 
guided by the O.A.U. resolution in her recognition of a 
secessionist state in Nigeria. Nevertheless all the East 
African states honoured the O.A.U. resolutions on the Congo 
and the Arab-Israeli conflicts.
Chapter five has probed into the theory and practice 
of nonalignment in East Africa. Within the framework of 
global politics, nonalignment can be deprived as noncommitment 
in the Cold War conflict system. But in East Africa, nonalign­
ment may be deprived not only in terms of non-participation 
in the Cold War but also in regards to the pursuit of nar­
rower national interests. Because of the need for accele­
rated economic development the East African states'have 
chosen to draw advantages from both East and West without 
getting involved in the Cold War conflicts. This chapter 
also considered the similarities and differences between 
declaratory policies, attitudinal orientation and operative 
policies of these states in the pursuit of nonalignment.
Lastly, a brief study has been made into the policies 
toward the United Nations.
iv
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CHAPTER I 
THE EAST AFRICAN STATES
If South Africa has been a strategic enticement 
and a glitter of the earth; and West Africa has 
been malaria - Dr. Azikiwe, Governor-General of 
Nigeria wanted to erect a statue to the mosquito- 
humidity and disappointing company reports; then 
East Africa has been a pleasant climate,
- A.J, Hughes, East Africa. African Library, p. 13.
The area that is generally referred to as East Africa 
is çomposed of three principal states - Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda. Their evolution towards self-government was 
slower than in the case of their counterparts in West 
Africa because of many reasons. In Kenya, good climate 
had attracted a large population of European settlers.
Most of the settlers belonged to an economically dominant 
class and cherished their social ties with the prosperous 
and conservative forces in Europe. Administratively, the 
Africans were restricted to local government and were kept 
out of central, political affairs. This fostered tribal­
ism and led to a divisive policy of provincialism. In 
Uganda, shallow nationalism and the "particular bolstering 
of the position of the Kabaka and the traditionalists in 
Buganda encouraged their intransigence, and this inevita­
bly led to the delaying of independence."^ Tanzania was
1
A.J,Hughes, East Africa; The Search for Unity, Penguin 
African Library Books, Inc., Great Britain, 
1963, p. 31.
1
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2a little more fortunate. For almost throughout the terri­
tory, no single tribal unit possessed the size, wealth and 
education to dominate the others. While these factors
provide an opportunity for the rapid growth of an 
organized and united demand for self-government...the 
backwardness of the country meant that most officials of 
the Party (TANU) were necessarily people with little or 
no formal education who did not always see the long-term 
implications of their attitudes, or of official Party 
policy. 2
However, progress towards independence became accele­
rated after i9 6 0 . Tanganyika opened the way by securing 
its independence in December, 1 9 6 1. This was followed by 
Uganda in October 1962, despite her intertribal friction. 
Kenya’s independence was granted on December 11, 1963 in 
response to the melodramatic attempt of the East African 
territories to federate.
THE LAND AND PEOPLE
Kenya was a former British colony that was leased from 
Zanzibar in 1 8 8 7. It is bounded on the South by Tanzania, 
on the West by Uganda, on the North-West by the Sudan, on 
the North by Ethiopia, on the North-East by the Somali 
Republic and on the East Coast by the Indian Ocean. It has 
a total area of 224,960 square miles and had about 8.5 mil­
lion people in 1962. Of this population, 8 million were 
Africans. The non-African population of 270,321 included
2
Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, London, Oxford
University Press, 1966, p. 2.
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‘ 3
1 7 6 ,6 1 3 Asians, 55,759 Europeans and 34,048 Arabs. However, 
the predominant African population is far from being homo­
geneous. There are fourteen distinct ethnic groups, with 
the Kikuyus representing almost twenty per cent, followed 
by the Luo and the Luhya, each with about thirteen percent. 
Swahili, a Bantu language with a heavy Arabic admixture 
and English are the official languages.
Tanzania was the name chosen on April 26, 1964, when 
the former British-administered League of Nations trust 
territory of Tanganyika joined in union with the Islands 
of Zanzibar and Pemba to become a United Republic. Tanga­
nyika, now referred to as mainland Tanzania, is located 
between Lakes Victoria, Nyasa, Tanganyika and the Indian 
Ocean. It has a total area of 362,688 square miles and is 
bordered on the North by Kenya and Uganda, on the West by 
Rwanda, Burundi and the Congo and on the South by Zambia, 
Malawi and Mozambique. The area was originally administer­
ed by the German East Africa Company before it was passed 
to Great Britain under a League of Nations mandate. After 
1946, the territory became a United Nations trust under 
British supervision and on December 9, 1 9 6 1, Tanganyika 
became an independent state under Prime Minister Julius 
Nyerere.
"Tanganyika is a geographical expression rather than 
a nation, with 120 different tribes. Most of these are 
self-contained, isolated from their neighbors by language
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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3
and other barriers." Of the approximately 9.5 million po­
pulation estimated in 1962, 99 per cent were Africans. 
Others included the Indians, the Arabs and a European po­
pulation of about 20,000. The indigenous African popula­
tion comprised of the Chagga, the Somalis, the Kikuyus and 
the Masais.
»
Zanzibar and Pemba comprised a sultanate under British 
administration before their independence on December 10, 
1 9 6 3. With an area of 640 square miles, Zanzibar is the 
largest Island on the east coast of Africa. By 1958 census 
figures, Zanzibar's 165,253 population was comprised of 
about 7 5 .8  per cent Africans, I6 . 9  per cent Arab, 5.7 per 
cent Indians and 0.1 per cent Europeans. The African group 
include the mainland Africans and the Shirazi who claim to 
be indigenous and to have part-Persian ancestry.
For nearly two centuries after the discovery of the 
Cape of Good Hope by Vasco da Gama, the Portuguese had been 
very interested in Zanzibar because of its strategic posi­
tion on the route to the riches of the Far East.
At the end of the seventeenth century, the inhabit­
ants of Zanzibar drove out the Portuguese with the assis­
tance of the Arabs of Oman, and an Arab governor was sub­
sequently sent to govern. 4
3
4
John Gunther, Inside Africa, New York, Harper and Bro­
thers, 1953, First Ed. p. 405.
Helen Kitchen, A Handbook of African Affairs, New York, 
Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1964,
p. 1 8 0.
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5For a long time the governmental structure and cultural 
ties were based on the Arab pattern. But in 1886 Britain 
and Germany signed an agreement specifying their respect­
ive spheres of influence within Zanzibar without reference 
to the ruling Sultan. In 1 8 9 0, the territory was formally
proclaimed a British Protectorate under the terms of the
%
Anglo-German Heligoland Treaty. After independence in 
1963 Zanzibar was governed by a coalition of the Arab-led 
Zanzibar People’s Party and a conservative Shirazi movement 
On January 12, 1964 the Afro-Shirazi Party, led by Abeid 
Karume planned the coup d'etat that made him the Chief of 
State.
Pemba is an adjacent island that lies twenty-five mi­
les to the northeast of Zanzibar. It has an area of 380 
square miles. It is inhabited by a motley population of 
1 3 3 ,8 5 8 people. Together making up the United Republic of 
Tanzania, Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Pemba have a combined 
population estimated at 10.3 million in 1964.
The third distinct East African state is Uganda. It 
lies astride the Equator and is bounded on the east by 
Kenya, on the south by Tanzania and Rwanda, on the west by 
Congo Kinshasa and on the north by the Sudan. It has an 
area of about 91,000 square miles and a population of about
7.5 million. Anthropologists have classified the African 
population there into the Bantu, the Nilotic, the Nilo- 
Hamitic and the Sudanic groups. Of all the groups, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Bantus are the most numerous. They Include the Baganda 
tribe which constitutes the largest ethnic group in Uganda 
with nearly 2 million people. The Iteso is considered as 
the second largest tribe followed by the Ankole, the Bun- 
yoro and the Basoga each having more than half a million 
people. Other minority groups include the Asians who num­
ber about 88,000 and are mainly of Indian extraction. They 
are primarily skilled workers and small businessmen. The
9,000 Europeans in the country are primarily British.
While English is the official language, Buganda is also 
spoken by a good proportion of the African population.
The early explorers discovered Uganda in the middle 
of the nineteenth century. "In 1875 the journalist-ex- 
plorer, Stanley, arrived in Buganda from the East Coast 
and dispatched his famous letter to the Daily Telegraph, 
calling for Christian missionaries to go out and work in 
the country."
5
•Buganda was the most powerful of all the ancient Uganda
Kingdoms. It even lent its name in a way to the whole
territory. Translators who were with the first British 
explorers to reach the protectorate could not sort out the 
changing prefixes in the language.
Buganda is the name of the Kingdom.
Buganda is the language.
Kiganda is an adjective pertaining to anything that has to 
do with Buganda.
Muganda is the name for a native of Buganda.
Baganda is the plural of Muganda.
Kabaka is the name for the King.
See John Gunther, op. cit., p. 425.
6
A.J. Hughes, East Africa, p. l47.
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7The missionaries began to arrive in large numbers after 
1 8 7 7. In the few years that followed, religious wars broke 
out between the Christian groups, the Muslims and the nat­
ives. Meantime Captain (later Lord) Lugard was exploring 
the country further for the Imperial British East African 
Company. In 1893, the British government succeeded in col­
onizing Buganda and in 1900 the Union Jack was hoisted over 
the rest of Uganda by the terms of a treaty called the 
Uganda Agreement. Since then Uganda has been under the 
British hegemony until she achieved her independence on 
October 9, 1962 under a coalition government headed by 
Prime Minister Milton Obote.
Thus, with a total area of 683,020 square miles. East 
Africa is about a fifth of the size of the United States. 
Kenya is about the size of England and Uganda is a little 
smaller than Great Britain. The total estimate of the po­
pulation of the East African states is 26.5 million. Of
this estimate, Africans comprised about 97.5 per cent
7
before the Asian exodus from Kenya after 1968.
7
At the time of independence, non-Africans were given the 
option to apply for full Kenyan citizenship or maintain 
their British passports. But following the Kenyan goals 
of economic reconstruction and the accompanying need for 
local participation, government legislation was more fa­
vourable to bona fide Kenyans. This Africanization po­
licy affected the Asians with British passports and they 
were compelled to leave the country. Over 3,000 moved 
to Britain and many other countries. The term "Indians" 
include the Hindus, Pakistanis and Goans who had been 
living in Kenya since British rule.
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8ECONOMIC RESOURCES
With the possible exception of Kenya where moderate 
commercial activities have offset complete reliance on ag­
riculture, East African States are generally poor. A gen­
eral reason for the economic disability is the low level of
industrialization, lack of capital and difficulties in the
$
way of the improvement of native cultivation. Poverty, 
which is a common denominator in the study of East African 
economies, is further compounded by specific factors in 
each country.
In Kenya, the one dominant factor that has persisted 
from the time of colonization to the present, is the pro­
blem of land distribution. The land problem has constitu­
ted an extremely abstruse and controversial subject in the 
Kenyan politics. The Africans have constantly accused the 
European population of greediness; that they came to Africa 
to grab the best land thereby leaving the native citizens 
with barren tracts for cultivation.
In sixteen months (1903-4) 220,000 Highland acres were 
transferred to 342 individual Europeans, and moreover huge 
tracts - blocks of 300,000 acres or more - went to Europ­
ean syndicates...Of the 68,700 square miles of Kenyan arable 
land in 1911, 7,000 of the 42,000 European settlers held
1 6 ,0 0 0  square miles or 24 per cent of this; five and a 
half million Africans had to get along as best they could 
on the rest. 8
However, in defense of their acquisition rights, the Euro­
peans maintain that their area of settlement was hitherto
5-----------
John Gunther, Inside Africa, p. 319.
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9sparsely populated by peoples with a wide variety of cul­
tures, among whom the predominant folk were the Masai who 
ranged with their herds over a large section of the south­
ern and western highlands. Since independence, pressure 
of population and government intensive efforts to improve 
native cultivation have encouraged land redistribution.
At a news conference in Nairobi on August 12, 1964, Jomo 
Kenyatta said that:
The British Government has today agreed to provide the 
Kenya Government with 1.5 million pounds partly by loan and 
partly by gift, to enable European farms in the Kalou sa­
lient, and in the Dundori-Bahati areas, to be purchased and 
Africans to be settled on the land...The acreage of land in 
question is around two million acres which will accommodate
200,000 families, or about a million people. 9
Notwithstanding the land disputes, Kenya is regarded as the 
richest country in East Africa. Good climate and commer­
cial agriculture have encouraged Industrialization. Cash 
crops like coffee, sisal, tea and tobacco are grown on the 
fertile areas, but stock-rearing is still based on tradi­
tional customs. In the big cities, especially around 
Nairobi, commercial activities have flourished very well in 
recent years.
Tanzania, the largest state in area and population, 
is the most politically stable but also the poorest. In 
fact, its poverty is legendary. Apart from the North- 
Western Highlands, "the greater part of the interior of
9
Jomo Kenyatta, Earambee! London, Oxford University Press,
1964, pp. 73-74.
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Tanzania represents a vast undulating plateau, averaging
2,000-4,000 feet from sea-level, whose surface is broken
by residual hills and ridges left by the lowering of the
10
plateau through denudation,"
The land configuration, low precipitation and the
native system of shifting cultivation have inhibited me-
♦
chanized agriculture. The traditional peasant agriculture 
al system, primarily concerned with the production of sub­
sistence crops, is still regarded as a resource to be ex­
ploited rather than a liability to be dispensed with. 
Productivity is painfully low and industrialization is small, 
In a memorandum to TANU's National Executive in June 
1966, Nyerere argued that,
a poor country like Tanzania where there is in any 
case little attraction for capital investment, development 
depends primarily on the efforts and hard work of our own 
people, and on their enthusiasm and belief that they and 
their country will benefit from whatever they do. 11
Six months later, on February 5, 1967, the much-publicized
Arusha Declaration was formulated on the principle that the
self-reliance of the peasant population be matched by self-
sacrifice and socialist commitment of the leadership. Under
this strategy, the state took over the key industries.
10
Walter Fitzgerald, Africa; A Social, Economic and Po­
litical Geography of its Major Regions, London, 
Methven & Go. Ltd.', 1967, p. 238.
11
John Lonsdale, "The Tanzanian Experiment", African 
Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 269, Oct. 1968, p. 333.
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banks, the export-import houses, and some of the major 
foreign manufacturing enterprises. A system of compen­
sation was simultaneously organized under the Danish firm 
of auditors H. C. Steen Hansen. While the result of the 
nationalization policy may be difficult to assess as yet, 
Nyerere is convinced that the precarious plight of the 
Tanzanian economy warranted such bold and ambitious plan­
ning. Meanwhile the peasant farmers are encouraged to 
double their yield on subsistence crops along with their 
few cash crops of coffee, sisal and seed beans.
In Uganda, the situation of the economy is not much 
better. The over-all problem, which is affected by a 
multitude of factors, is low productivity. Like Tanzania 
and Kenya, the economy is agrarian, involving the growing 
of subsistence crops, communal help in building and an 
almost self-sufficient kind of living. The other side of 
the economy is relatively recent. This is the market eco­
nomy that subjects economic life to national and interna­
tional trade. It involves growing coffee for the market 
and buying transistor radios and manufactured goods in re­
turn. But unlike Tanzania, Uganda is pursuing an open- 
door economic policy for investments. This is intended to 
accelerate industrialization since lack of capital has 
hindered industrial development.
However, in the commercial life of Uganda the Indian po- 
pulation-about 77,400 (I96l)-is of critical importance, and it 
is believed that they control 90 per cent of the total trade




During colonial rule, the Indians and the European commu­
nities in Uganda established a friendly relationship that 
could not be found in any other part of East Africa. This 
gave the Indians a good opportunity to maintain commercial 
contacts with India and many industrial countries. They 
also controlled the export- crops of cotton and coffee.
For cotton, they found a ready market in the textile in­
dustry of the Bombay Presidency and coffee was sent to the 
European countries. It is interesting to note that the re­
action of the nationalists was initially indifferent to 
the Indian monopoly. But after independence. Prime Minis­
ter Obote encouraged native participation in commercial 
life along with foreign investment.
Thus, it can be safely assumed that the East African 
states ha-ve many things in common: the most striking being
poverty and general lack of industrial development. Sta­
tistics sometimes fail to convey the social background of 
an economy but they provide a basis for a comparison of 
local conditions with the rest of the world. The follow­
ing two tables provide an insight into the standard of 
living and level of industrialization in East Africa in 
relation to some selected African countries.
12
Walter Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 246.
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TABLE I
Gross National Product of Some African Countries 1963





Congo (Brazzaville) .75 140
Ghana 7.5 230
Nigeria 56.4 100
South Africa 18.3 530
Zambia 3.6 160
Morocco 12.9 170
Source: Gilbert L. Rutman, The Economy of Tanganyika,
New York, Frederick A. Praeger Pu­
blishers 1 9 6 8, pp. 42-7, Tables 14 & 
15.
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TABLE II








Congo 28 19 12 18 23
Malawi 48 0 5 18 29
Morocco 32 6 14 29 19
Nigeria 65 2 5 16 12
Rhodesia 22 5 16 22 35
South Africa 9 12 21 21 37
Sudan 55 0 5 16 24
Zambia 13 48 6 13 20
Kenya 43 0 9 22 26 '
Tanzania 60 2 4 16 18
Uganda 61 2 7 13 17
East Africa 54 2 7 17 20
Source; The United Nations National Accounts Yearbook for 
1964, United Nations, New York
Also see Gilbert L. Rutman, The Economic Geography 
of Africa, New York, Frederick A. Praeger 
Publishers 1968, pp. 9-12, Tables 1 & 2.
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Table I shows the Gross National Product per capita of 
some selected African countries. A salient feature of the 
table is the marked poverty of the East African States as 
indicated by the low G.N.P.
Table 2 gives a helpful data in assessing the low 
level of industrialization and the dependence of East 
African countries on agriculture. Even the few industries 
available are geared towards the processing of agricultural 
and primary production for exports. Production figures and 
other measures that would be desirable for closer compari­
son are not available, but it is quite clear that Kenya 
has the largest industrial development. It has a number of 
food industries and a considerable number of textiles and c 
shoe factories. Uganda has some food and cotton industries 
while Tanzania produces some limited forest industries, 
building materials including cement and traditional food 
products.
In general, the preceding analysis has been intended 
to give a background information to the East African coun­
tries. Incidentally, the survey has gone some way towards 
demonstrating the capabilities of the respective countries. 
Geographically, the two great rift zones, the Kilimanjaro 
and Kenya mountains may have provided barriers of immense 
proportions for mechanized agriculture yet the landform 
disadvantage should not be exaggerated. For example,
Uganda has the greatest hydroelectric potential, how­
ever, with a developable capacity of at least 2 million
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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kilowatts on the Nile alone....The Owen Falls plant can be 
expanded, while another very favorable site occurs only
4.5 miles downstream. 13
Similarly, the topography and climate of Kenya has made the 
country a centre of tourist attraction in East Africa. 
Demographically, the population of East Africa is seizable 
but it is unevenly distributed on the land area. Poor 
health, high illiteracy rate, incidence of tradition and 
tribal conflicts have inhibited efficiency and lowered 
manpower quality in the territories. Economically the 
East African countries belong to the class of "under-dev­
eloped states", where, because of scarce capital, industri­
alization is scanty, productivity is low and the economy is 
primarily agrarian. Rate of growth of both Gross National 
Product and industrial output may continue to be disappoin­
ting owing to the poor natural resources and the outmoded 
system of cultivation. But dismal as this picture of the 
East African economies may appear, the intangible side of 
the countries' capabilities is not so unattractive. The 
extent to which leadership, political institutions and 
ideology have influenced political stability of the East 
African states will be examined in the succeeding chapter.
13
William A. Hance, African Economic Development, New
York, Frederick A. Praeger Publish­
ers 1 9 6 7, p. 2 0 5.
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CHAPTER II
DOMESTIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
For a new state, foreign policy is domestic policy 
pursued by other means; it is domestic policy car­
ried beyond the boundaries of the state,
-B.C. Good, Neutralism and Nonalignment, p. 12.
*
Professor Hermann has charged that students of inter­
national affairs have "displayed considerable reluctance to 
delve into the domestic factors that distinguish one nation's 
policies from another's. On the other hand, scholars of com­
parative politics, with their knowledge of political insti­
tutions and processes, have rarely considered the effect of
2
various political arrangements on foreign policy." If a 
research worker can underplay the influence of domestic fac­
tors in the study of the foreign policy of developed count­
ries, such action would be even more undesirable for a suc­
cessful appraisal of the foreign policy of the East African 
states. •
For European countries with an international life 
going back over many centuries.not only is the subject 
matter abundant for the research-worker, but there is also 
a historical perspective which furnishes a more integrated
1
R.C. Good, "New State-building as a Determinant of For­
eign Policy", Neutralism and Nonalignment.
L. W. Martin (ed.). New York, Frederick A. 
Praeger Publishers, 1962, p. 12.
2
Hermann, O.F., "The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy", 
World Politics. Volume XX, No.3, Anril 1968, 
p. 521.
17
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view of the flux of events, enabling us to determine the 
causes of the phenomena observed with more certainty and
precision........... Black Africa possesses neither this
long practice in international life, which allows of 
broad historical perspectives, nor state structures that 
have stood the test of time and use, nor a philosophy of 
political power enabling the personal idiosyncrasies of 
leaders to be disregarded, in theory at least. 3
But, in spite of this, the contents of politics have al­
ways been the struggle for*power whether in the developed 
or the developing countries, locally or on the internat­
ional level. In most cases, decisions affecting both 
domestic and foreign policies are determined by the same 
appropriate body. In the new states, for example, formal 
independence has been achieved, the legal myths of sov­
ereignty have been donned and national elites are put in 
position to make policies based on national interest.
The policies are usually intended to consolidate the fruits 
and ideals of independence, to provide better standards 
of living, protect the people against external aggression 
and promote national identity.
Nowadays the distinction between home and foreign po­
licy is largely a matter of practical convenience; they 
are two scales in the same balance, two aspects of the 
Indivisible reality. 4
3
Boudou Thiam, The Foreign Policy of African States,
New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Publi­
shers, 1 9 6 5, p. 2.
4
Ibid, p. xi.
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Often times, internal factors project into the internation­
al scene while, correspondingly, external relations may 
have serious effects on domestic policy. In this chapter, 
attempts will be made to correlate the role of political 
institutions, quality of leadership, ideology and the psy­
chological influence of goyernmental stability within the 
framework of national policy,
LEADERSHIP
"One of the great questions of history is whether si­
tuations make leaders or whether it is the completely ac­
cidental appearance of a certain man that makes history go
5
one way or another," Would there have been a Tanzania 
without Julius lyerere? Would Uganda have remained a uni­
fied nation without Milton Obote? Would there have been 
peace in multi-racial Kenya without Kenyatta? It is dif­
ficult to provide any satisfactory answers to these ques­
tions, This is because most African countries depend for 
leadership on a handful of men. In many of the countries 
it is hard to see beyond a single figure. This apparent 
inability to provide alternative, efficient leadership re­
flects the youthfulness of the African states and the under-
5
T, P, Melady, Profiles of African Leaders. Hew York,
The Macmillan Company, 19^1 , p, 6,
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developed condition of their state machines. But this 
youth contrasts with the age of the societies which the 
states enclose. Unlike the traditional societies where 
state machineries were simple and the position of the lea­
der secularized, the implications of democracy and modern 
state management involve enlightenment, tolerance, comp­
romise and shrewd understanding of the complex factors in 
international relations. Today, mere nationalist impulses 
are not sufficient pre-requisites for effective leadership. 
Education, charisma and ability to unite national elites, 
control over political processes, insight, perception of 
dangers and ability to avoid disasters go along with lead­
ership.
In Kenya, President Jomo Kenyatta is regarded as the 
embodiment of nationhood. Since independence, he has been 
acclaimed as the most important single symbol of national 
identification and described as
the indispensable keystone holding together the dis­
parate segments of the governing Kenya African National 
Union, and as the one authoritative voice capable of re­
assuring the country's remaining 55,000 European settlers 
that independence would not usher in another Congo, 6
As an unimpeachable freedom fighter, jailed and persecuted
in the process of decolonization, he has endeared himself
to the people with a charisma that is indispensable in the
new state building. Similarly, as a member of the dominant
6
Helen Kitchen, A Handbook of African Affairs, New York,
Frederick A, Praeger Publishers 1964, ' 
p. 74,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
21
Kikuyu tribe and a paternal figure in an age-group conscious 
society, Kenyatta commands the allegiance of the majority 
of the Kenya people. Above all, in contemporary African 
politics where provincialism and local interests have re­
sulted in the overthrow of various civilian governments, 
he has chosen to be pragmatic rather than ideological, mo­
derate rather than radical,» These character traits have 
helped tremendously in accomodating the ambitious elite 
group and in projecting national goals above partisan in­
terests, Abroad, Kenyatta's popularity and prestige con­
tinue to increase in spite of his seldom travelling beyond 
the country's bofders,
Tanzania is led by an extraordinarily popular and able 
leader. President Julius Nyerere, With a Masters degree in 
history and economics, Nyerere is usually regarded as one 
of the intellectual leaders in Africa, A "militant nation­
alist", as he often regards himself, he is essentially id­
eological, radical but humanitarian. Some observers feel 
that Nyerere's personality and temperament reflect the 
kind of leadership needed for political development in a 
backward economy with a dearth of technical and entrepre­
neurial personnel and an excessive dependence on subsis­
tence agriculture. His eloquence and organizational abi­
lity have borne an indelible imprint on the Tanganyika 
African National Union, In a country with high illiteracy 
and lack of forceful elite groups, he inherits the domin­
ant position in policy formulation. Despite the fact that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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he comes from the Zanaki, which constitutes one of the 
smallest tribes in Tanganyika, his qualification^as the 
njost enlightened man allow him to enjoy a reign of office 
that cannot be successfully challenged by other members of 
his party.
In contrast to Tanzania, leadership in Uganda is more
»
complicated and unstable. Until recently, it was difficult 
to locate the effective leader of the country. This con­
fusion was caused by the cleavage between the traditional­
ist Buganda's Kabaka and the more modern Prime Minister 
Milton Obote, This implies that for some time nobody real­
ly maintained a monopoly of power. The existence of a 
small but well-educated African elite (Makerere University 
College was established in 1921) made competition for lead­
ership more pronounced. However,
it is generally agreed that the progress which Uganda 
made toward nationhood between 196I and 1964 was due large­
ly to the tactical skill of Prime Minister Obote and the 
tacit cooperation of younger Baganda politicians whose id­
eological sympathies lie with Mr, Obote’s party even if 
they dare not risk an open break with the Buganda esta­
blishment, 7
In attempting to reconcile modern politics with tribal tra­
ditions, Obote has quietly and methodically cut his way 
through hardships involving the use of diplomacy and ruth­
lessness, As a member of Langi, one of the smallest tribes 
from northern Uganda, Obote lacks the overwhelming prestige
7
Helen Kitchen, Ibid, p, 170,
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of Kenya's veteran nationalist, Jomo Kenyatta. Neither does 
he possess the personal magnetism of his other East African 
neighbour, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, But in spite of 
these drawbacks, Obote is one of the shrewdest African di­
plomats, In his initial attempts to unite the country and 
improve his political base, he married his Baganda secreta­
ry in November 1963. At the time of independence, he head­
ed a coalition government that would have united the north 
with Buganda, But following the persistent outbreak of un­
rest and the competitive claim of the Kabaka to leadership 
in 1 9 6 6, Obote swiftly out-manoeuvred his rival, drove him 
to exile, put five of his leading ministers into detention, 
suspended the constitution and established the foundation 
for eventual dictatorship. Thus, Obote proved that defer­
ence and overwhelming allegiance to leadership may not be 
automatic in many states but personal initiative may create 
the atmosphere necessary for political tranquility. Mean­
while Obote is maintaining an uneasy peace as the dissid­
ence of the traditionalist Baganda seems controlled,
STABILITY, IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
"Political stability is a condition in which there is 
continuity of government, and in which some reliable pre­
diction is possible regarding the broad course of policy,
8
J. W, Burton, Nonalignment, New York, J, E, Heineman, 
Inc,, 1966, p, 6 3 ,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
24
Theoretically there are two forms of stable government; 
one is an entrenched dictatorship which guarantees the con­
tinuity of both government and policy for a considerable 
length of time. The other form of stable government allows 
for changes in both policy and leadership of the nation 
through constitutional and orderly processes. However, 
both forms of government operate on ideology and the use 
of institutions.
Ideology is a response to reality. It maintains 
solidarity and identity and promotes its ovm durability. 
Ideology not only rationalizes, explaining the reasons 
for the present situation; it also points the way to 
the future goal, 9
Although the East African leaders may not have provi­
ded ideologies that apply to countries beyond their front­
iers, catch phrases and principles such as "African Soc­
ialism", "One-Party State" and "African Personality" have 
been constantly used to dramatize state goals and poli­
cies.
In.Kenya, African socialism means a social, democra­
tic kind of welfare state that reflects government deve­
lopment planning which gives no hindrance to entrepren­
eurial capitalism. In the words of Jomo Kenyatta,
we shall continue to play our part, in accelerating 
capital accumulation. And we are determined to accelerate 
economic growth within the context of African Socialism, 
meaning that both the Government and private enterprise
9
Vernon McKay, African Diplomacy; Studies in the Deter­
minants of Foreign Policy, Hew York, Frederick 
A, Praeger Publishers, 1966, p, 38,
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will have a contribution to make. 10
In fact; in the attempt to give credence to his version of 
African Socialism, Jomo Kenyatta issued his Sessional Paper 
Ten, which provided safeguards for private property and in­
ducements for foreign investments. Investment allowances 
and special taxation privileges were likewise granted en­
trepreneurs along with the provisions of the Foreign Invest­
ments Protection Bill which allow free movements of capital 
within and outside the country. A pledge against fears of 
nationalization was made in view of the fact that, "nation­
alization will not serve to advance the cause of African 
11
Socialism", Simultaneously, the government pledged a 
policy of tariff protection to pioneer and infant indust­
ries so that they could compete favourably with foreign in­
vestments, To ease the domestic ills of unemployment, how­
ever, the government pleaded with the private entrepreneurs 
to expand training of skilled personnel to include African 
secondary school leavers. It is contended that increased 
personnel training would encourage rapid Africanization of 
managerial life both in the public sector and in the busi­
ness corporation.
In Tanzania, the political philosophy of African Soc­
ialism is widely different from that of Kenya, In an
10
11
Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee! The Prime Minister of Kenya's 
Speeches 1963-1964. London, Oxford University 
Press, 1964, p, 76.
Ibid, p, 79,
257140
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attempt to provide a theoretical base for the government
planning of the economy, Julius Nyerere put forward the
12
idea of 'Ujamaa' in 1962. 'Ujamaa' supposedly dramatizes 
the socio-economic behaviour of Africans in the traditional 
society,
'Ujamaa', then, or 'familyhood' describes our social­
ism, It is opposed to capitalism, which seeks to build a 
happy society on the basis'"of the exploitation of man by 
man; and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism 
which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of 
inevitable conflict between man and man, 13
In this notion, Nyerere tried to emphasize the communal 
nature of the African society, where "nobody starved, 
whether of food or human dignity, because he lacked per­
sonal wealth; he could depend on the wealth possessed by 
the community of which he was a member. That was socialism. 
That is socialism,
Therefore, Nyerere exhorted his people to go back to 
the traditional African custom of landholding whereby land 
belonged to the community and the individual's "right to 
land was simply the right to use it". He further urged that 
the capitalist attitude of mind which colonialism brought to 
Africa, with its emphasis on individualism, must be reject-
12
Ujamaa is one of those Swahili words which cannot be 
satisfactorily translated into English, For present pur­
poses, 'familyhood', 'brotherhood', or 'friendship' could 
be substituted,
^^ Julius K, Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p, 170,
14
Ibid, p, l64.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
27
ed altogether, Whether or not this tenacious clinging to 
traditional values is conducive to modern economic develop­
ment is debatable, Nkrumah was probably correct when he 
asserted that
Today the phrase 'African socialism' seems to espouse 
the view that the traditional African society was a class­
less society imbued with the spirit of humanism and to ex­
press a nostalgia for that 'spirit,- Such a conception of 
socialism makes a fetish of the communal African society. 
Colonialism deserves to be blamed for many evils in Africa, 
but surely it was not preceded by an African Golden Age or 
paradise, A return to pre-colonial African society is 
evidently not worthy of the ingenuity and efforts of our 
people. 15
Here, it is interesting to note that Hkrumah and Nyerere
who often shared similar views and deep sentiments on many
aspects of African politics seem to be distinctly opposed
16
on the interpretation of African Socialism,
However, in his attempt to be practical and increase 
the credibility of African socialism in relation to the 
Tanzanian economy. President Nyerere instituted the self- 
reliance, socialist blueprint of the Arusha Declaration in
15
Kwame Nkrumah, "African Socialism Revisited", African 
Forum, Volume I, No, 3, 1966, pp, 4-5.
16
Also note the contradiction in the operational defini­
tion of African Socialism between Kenyatta and Nyerere,
The concept of socialism is elusive in the African context. 
It is hard to get consensus on what socialism means especi­
ally when one compares the definition of left-wing African 
nationalists with that of the moderates. But, with varying 
shades of distinction and emphasis, theorists on African 
socialism usually invoke African traditional life both as 
the basis of the concept as well as the major factor which 
distinguishes it from the European socialism. See Kenneth 
Grundy, "The Class Struggle in Africa: An Examination of 
Conflicting Theories", Journal of Modern African Studies 
Vol, 2, No, 3, November 1964, p, 379’.
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1967. The rationale for the inward-looking policy was sim­
ple, Tanzania as a poor country would have to raise itself 
by its bootstraps and the operation would have to be based 
largely on agricultural production. Certain parts of the 
money economy had been infiltrated by local, eminent poli­
ticians who have used their offices to profit from foreign
»
investment and capitalism. In accordance with the self-, 
help philosophy, "mercenary politicians" would have to be 
denied active participation in the government, TAîIU offi­
cials could not ovm or participate in business enterprises; 
in other words, leaders could not receive more than one sal­
ary, Finally, self-reliance would replace expectation of 
and dependence on foreign aid. As expected, the Tanzanian 
elites were cool towards this socialist and almost ascetic 
doctrine. It would seem as if President Nyerere was the 
sole protagonist of the Declaration although the doctrine 
has now received the official stamp of the government and 
the TANU', It could be assumed that Nyerere has succeeded 
in convincing his people that the nature of Tanzania's ec­
onomic ailment warranted such drastic surgery.
On his own, President Milton Obote of Uganda has been 
too pre-occupied with establishing a firm domestic politi­
cal base and prestige to give any philosophical depth to the 
socio-economic relations of the Uganda people. Therefore, 
it is hard to give any fair appraisal of what he would call 
African socialism. All that can be said is that with a 
liberal attitude to foreign investments and the capitalist
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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attitudes of the elites, Milton Ohote would probably favour 
an African socialism as defined by Jomo Kenyatta, For ex­
ample, in October 1967, the Ugandan Minister of Commerce 
and Industry, Mr. Kalema, said that, "the government would 
continue to allow private investors to operate alongside 
government-owned organizations because we believe that in
Uganda, there is room for b'oth private and public invest- 
17
ment".
Another basic value that pervades the political ma­
chinery of the East African countries is the "single party 
system". At independence, the same pattern of British par­
liamentary democracy could be observed in all the countries. 
But some years after, leaders began to put forth their ideas 
and assessments of the two-party system. The general atti­
tude of the leaders could be summed up in Julius Nyerere's 
remarks that:
Our cvm parties had a very different origin. They 
were not formed to challenge any ruling group of our own 
people; .they were formed to challenge the foreigners who 
ruled over us. They were not, therefore, political "par­
ties" - i,e, factions - but nationalist movements, 18
Here, it is necessary to remark that although the stabili­
zing and most commonly the unifying role of the party is 
indisputable in East Africa, yet the structure and ideo­
logy of the parties are largely influenced by the leaders'
17
News in Brief, Africa Report, Vol, 12, No, 8, Nov, 1967, 
p. 36,
18
Julius Nyerere, "Democracy and the Party System", The 
Political Awakening of Africa, Martin Kilson, 
(ed,). New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc. 1965, p,126
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colonial experiences and their evaluation of domestic needs. 
In some instances the single-party system is an outgrowth - 
and continuation of the mobilization of people and groups 
that developed in the pre-independence period. In many 
cases, the single-party strategy is used by leaders to con­
solidate their powers, the moreso since there is an obvious 
interrelationship between the dominance of a single person 
and the discipline, control and structure of party organi­
zation, So long as strong personal leadership continues, 
mass loyalty would remain structured towards the single fi­
gure rather than the party organization,
Kenya manifests rather peculiar characteristics of a 
one party state. In the early years of independence, Jomo 
Kenyatta feared that the popular pressures that were muste­
red against the colonial regime could be directed at him by 
members of the opposition. This is not difficult to illus­
trate from events that followed the first election to the
Federal Assembly in February, 1 96I, KANU won nineteen
19
seats to KADU’s eleven, KANU refused to form a govern­
ment as a protest to facilitate the release of Jomo Kenyatta 
who had been in detention since the Mau Mau uprising. The 
colonial administration refused to be influenced. Instead 
it called on the KADU to form a minority government with
19
KADU is an abbreviation for Kenya African Democratic 
Union which became the official opposition party after the 
1963 general elections.
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the support of some appointed European and Asian adminis­
trators. However, in the 19^3 elections, KANU won a great­
er majority and Jomo Kenyatta was released to become the 
Prime Minister. Thus, at the time of independence in 
December 1963, there were two parties in Kenya.
Consequently, Jomo Kenyatta was conscious of the 
Opposition and the European force's in Kenyan politics. He 
would do nothing to aggravate race relations nor make spe­
eches that could inflame violence from the tribally-based 
KADU opposition. Instead he appealed to
the Opposition to realize that we have a country to 
build,,,.that we cannot develop by throwing mud in one 
another's faces....whether people are KANU or KADU, and no 
matter to what tribe they belong, the Government knows only 
citizens, 20
But systematically and firmly, Kenyatta continued to conso­
lidate influence and expanded his political base. On 
August 13, 1964 he announced that Kenya would henceforth 
work towards a one-party State, He explained that,
we reject a blueprint of the Western model of a two- 
party system of Government, because we do not subscribe to 
the notion of the Government and the governed being in op­
position to one another, one clamouring for duties and the 
other crying for rights, 21
In the same speech, Jomo Kenyatta argued that KADU was not 
formed on a majority-rule concept but that the leaders of 
the party were conceited, and unreliable politicians. At 
this stage Kenyatta guaranteed that a one-party state would
20
21
Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee! p,8.
Ibid, p, 24,
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not usher in tyranny nor the deprivation of human rights. 
KANU, the government party, would ensure freedom of speech, 
of association and assembly. KANU felt that Kenya could 
not afford opposition just for the sake of opposition.
On November 10, 1964, Ronald Ngala, leader of the KADU 
opposition party announced that all members of his parliam­
entary group would henceforth work with the Government and 
that KADU has been dissolved. He concluded by paying glow­
ing tributes to Kenyatta and expressed hopes that his ac­
tion would accelerate detribalization and national unity. 
Thus, from November 1964 to June 1966 Kenya was a defacto 
and a de.lure one-party state. However, in July 1966, Vice 
President Oginga Odinga broke off from the KANU to form the 
Kenya People's Union (KPU). This was a culmination of an 
intra-party feud involving Tom Mboya over a contest for 
leadership. Even then and after, Odinga's party did not 
offset the predominance of the KANU party in Kenya's pol­
itics.
In Tanganyika, the one-party system was a result of
Nyerere's careful planning. He had earlier propounded that
young nations which "emerge as a result of a nationalist
movement should first be governed by a nationalist govern-
22
ment rather than a party government", Nyerere's conten­
tion was that the unity achieved during the struggles 
against colonialism was fragile and not strong enough to
22
Helen Kitchen, A Handbook of African Affairs, p,l6l.
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withstand the stresses of nation building. This unity 
should be consolidated. The desire to institutionalize 
unity consequently found expression in the one-party sys­
tem, Two-party politics was considered dangerous especial­
ly in a multi-tribal society like Tanganyika, But Nyerere  ^
was careful to distinguish the Tanganyikan single party 
prescription from other forms such as those that operate 
in the Communist countries. He thought that if membership 
were open to all and the single party were democratic, mi­
nority opinion could be heard without intimidation.
At the time of independence, TANU was already a mass 
movement and the de facto single party in Tanganyika, It 
was hierarchically organized and led by a charismatic lea­
der, It faced no organized interest groups and the posi­
tion of the leaders was secure. But after Nyerere and 
other top echelons of the Party had been absorbed into the 
Government in 1961, TANU organization became weakened, 
Nyerere had to step down as Prime Minister in order to re­
vitalize and reorganize it. In this process TAIUJ member­
ship was extended to everybody, African, non-African, civil- 
Servants or bureaucrats living in Tanganyika who could af­
ford to pay the two-shilling entrance fee, Grassroot par­
ty organizations were strengthened and by the time Julius 
Nyerere returned to the government in 1962, he was in full 
control of both government and party administration. How­
ever, it was not until 1964 that formal steps were taken 
for the establishment of a Constitution to make Tanganyika
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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a de jure One-Party state. On January 28, 1964, a Presiden­
tial Commission was appointed under the chairmanship of 
Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa
to consider what changes were necessary in the consti­
tution of Tanganyika and the Constitution of TANU, as well 
as in the practices of government, in order to bring into
effect a democratic one-party state, 23
The Commission invited public comment on a large number of
*
party, government, leadership and administrative issues and 
came out with its Report in March 1965. Besides constitu­
ting the basis for the Interim Constitution of the United 
Republic of Tanzania of July 1965, the Report
accepted that the One-Party State would be a reflec­
tion of political reality in Tanzania and that its formal­
ization would be designed to perpetuate that reality into 
the future, and with it the political stability that was
regarded as its product, 24
The Interim Constitution that was passed by Act 43 of 1965
further elevated the Party as the "institutionalized organ
of the State subject to the same controls and scrutiny of
25
the Cabinet, Parliament or the Civil Service", No doubt 
the organizational inheritance of the pre-independence 
period, lack of organized opposition, the ingenuity of
23
William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Tanzania,
Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1967, p.2, 
Also see Tanganyika Gazette, 7.2,64, General No­
tice no.300,
24
J, P, W. B, McAuslan, "Political Stability and Const- 
titutional Innovation in Tanzania", The World 
Today, December 1966, Vol, 22, No, 12, p, 537.
25
Colin Degum, "Single-Party Democracy?", The World Today, 
December 1965, Vol, 21, No, 12, p, 527,
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Nyerere and the social environment in Tanganyika had con­
tributed immensely to the predominance of the TANU party 
in present-day Tanzania.
But of the three East African countries, none has 
found it more difficult to attain the one-party status than 
Uganda. The competitive leadership, the Bugandan parochia­
lism, the complicated federal structure and the position of 
the traditionalist Kabaka Yekka (KY) party made the road to 
the one-party system very long and arduous. Milton Obote 
therefore chose to be pragmatic rather than overtly ideolo­
gical, But in spite of the caution, the single-party state 
offered an attraction. The attraction was reinforced by 
the obstructionist politics of the KY party, the separatist 
policy of the Kabaka and predominance of the Baganda that 
arose from the constitutional status guaranteed to Buganda 
during the pre-independence negotiation. This privileged 
"legal position of Buganda in the Uganda Constitution (1962) 
represented the solid achievement of Buganda's negotiating 
strength, and, until the events of November 1964 after the 
referendum on the lost counties, it suggested that the
Kabaka's Government could effectively insulate Buganda and
26
preserve its constitutional rights by litigation,"
In the April 1962 general elections Milton Obote's 
Uganda Peoples Party won thirty-seven of the ninety-one
26
J, M, Lee, "Buganda's Position in Federal Uganda",
Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 
Volume III, 1965, ed, Kenneth Robinson and 
¥, Morris Jones, p, 1 6 5,
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seats in Parliament, The other seats were won hy the Kaba­
ka Yekka Party with twenty-one and the Democratic Party with 
twenty-four, A coalition government between the Uganda 
Peoples Congress (UPC) and the KY was formed under Prime 
Minister Obote, Some years after the coalition government 
was formed, there grew evidences of its imminent collapse.
By December 1963, forty-eight of the ninety-one deputies 
in parliament were committed to the UPC, Further defect­
ions from both KY and the DP greatly strengthened the po­
sition of the UPC at the expense of the Buganda-based KY 
Party,
While this means that the UPC could now technically 
govern without Kabaka Yekka*s support, Mr, Obote apparent­
ly feels that it is safer politically to keep the creaky 
alliance functioning and avoid a premature polarization 27 
between the progressives and neotraditionalists in Buganda,
Meanwhile, Obote permitted constitutional debates on wheth­
er Uganda should adopt a unitary or a strong central govern­
ment in place of the existing loose federation. By the 
time the coalition government broke dotm in December 1964,
Mr, Obote had already made a statement which outlined the 
future of Uganda in terms of a single-party system. In a 
major policy address to a local meeting of the UPC in Lango 
(Northern Uganda) in 1964, he assailed
the factional and tribal groupings which inevitably 
divide our endeavour to build national consciousness and 
embark on the Socialist construction of our society,,,I 
am firmly convinced that a one-party state does not ine-
27
Helen Kitchen, A Handbook of African Affairs, p, 172,
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vitably and necessarily remove the opportunity of giving 
voice to the expression of individual opinion and the giv­
ing of constructive criticism,,.Socialist principles must 
guide, inform and govern the basis, form and content of all 
Institutions of our society. 28
By then, the UPC had in fact secured control of all elec­
ted assemblies in federal states and districts outside Bu­
ganda, some by electoral victories, others by defections 
from the DP. »
However, Buganda did not leave Obote's growing powers 
unchallenged. Early in 1966, violent disruptions broke out 
in Kampala, Obote took stiff action, created emergency po­
wers, muzzled the opposition, deposed the Kabaka and assu­
med full control of the government activities. In Septem­
ber 1 9 6 7, Uganda was proclaimed a Republic and the third 
Constitution after independence was imposed. Under it,
Obote became the President of a unitary state and the long 
aspiration to build a strong, unified, republican state be­
came almost a reality. In this turn of events, the UPC 
became the dominant party in the state,
Prom the foregoing discussion on factors affecting do­
mestic policy in East Africa, one can identify freedom, 
unity and economic survival as the major and all-pervading 
themes that concern the leaders. As Jomo Kenyatta once put 
it
all the noble Charters and Declarations of history and 
all the Constitutions that enshrine human rights have sprung 
from one paramount truth; that men in their spirit and in
28
News in Brief, African Report, Vol, 9, No, 2, February 
1964, p, 21,
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their striving, under the law, have the right to be free,29 
Because of their colonial experience, the three leaders 
(Obote, Kenyatta and Nyerere) believe that freedom and un­
ity are necessary conditions for the attainment of other 
goals. They think that, "a house divided against itself 
would not stand". They fear communal violence. They want 
to preserve peace, order and good government, Jomo Kenyatta 
still remembers the intrigues that surrounded the Mau Mau 
uprisings of the 1950*s. As the central figure, jailed 
rightly or wrongly for having masterminded the eruption, 
he is apprehensive of public reactions to bad policies. 
Similarly, the mutiny of the two battalions of the Tanga­
nyikan Army against their British officers in January 1964, 
and the outbreak of riots and tribal hostilities at Kampala 
in 1964 and 1966 are vivid illustrations of how easily 
public order could break down, Therefore, all the leaders 
are concerned about ways and means to improve communications, 
suppress tribal sentiments and cement national unity. This 
is one reason why all the leaders (with varying intensity 
and methods) prefer a single-party system. This is why the 
two-party system is rejected and rationalized as a luxury. 
Opposition parties have also been denounced as saboteurs 
while the position of the ruling parties has been enhanced. 
Economically, the three East African governments have
9
Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee! p, 1,
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been promoting programmes of development specially attuned 
to their interpretation of African socialism. Consequently, 
Socialism has become the a priori solution to economic ills. 
But the extent to which economic factors actually influence 
both domestic and foreign policies cannot easily be explain­
ed as some Marxists or other economic determinists may pos­
tulate. In some cases, economic considerations seem to be 
as important as the freedom and unity theme. In other 
cases economic factors seem to have played a subordinate 
role as it appears to be in Tanzania's refusal of aid from
West Germany and the rejection of the #21 m, loan from
.30
Britain over the Rhodesian issue. However, in both 
Uganda and Kenya where economic structure depends on for­
eign interests, the governments have tried to establish a 
"countervailing power" in order to ensure a more equitable 
distribution of national wealth. Both governments have 
adopted a creeping Africanization policy with a view to 
creating more job and business opportunities for the native 
Africans. For example, in April 1965, the Kenyan Minister 
for Commerce and Industry urged non-African businessmen to 
identify themselves with African aspirations by inviting 
Africans to buy shares in their enterprises. Minister 
Kiano said "while we do not discriminate against non- 
Africsns in Kenya, the spirit of give and take should pre-
30
Circumstances surrounding Tanzania's action will be 
explained later in the thesis.
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. 31
vail". Currently, both the Ugandan and the Kenyan gov­
ernments are selective in their issuing of business per­
mits to their Asians with British passports. It would 
appear that both governments are not only advocating the 
operation of African Socialism as such but the Africaniza­
tion of capitalism as well. According to Jomo Kenyatta;
The purpose of our Africanization programme is simple; 
to maintain an efficient and effective machine of Govern­
ment by and for Kenya's people,...We need at many levels not 
only talent and loyalty, but also experience. This is why 
training schemes have been instituted, and must be continued; 
to equip our poeple for posts of high responsibility, and 
give them opportunity to gain the maturity that comes from 
experience, 32
Finally, it should be remembered that in East Africa, in­
dependence was the result of successful nationalist revo­
lutions, The colonial administration was accused of eco­
nomic exploitation and blamed for the slow rate of social 
transformation of the Africans, Conscious of their tasks 
to eradicate diseases, poor nutrition and illiteracy, the 
three governments have embarked upon various projects in­
tended to expedite modernization. But modernization cannot 
be defined in exclusively Western values. For image and 
cultural reasons, the East African governments are select­
ive about the import of modernization "appearances" which 
seem to conflict with their criteria of ethics and tradi-
31
32
All A, Mazrui, "Borrowed Theory and Original Practice 
in African Politics", Patterns of African Develop­
ment , Herbert J, Spiro ed. New Jersey, Prentice- 
Hall, Inc., 1 9 6 7, p, 1 1 8,
Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee! p, 3.
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tional values. As evidenced in the new slogans of "African 
personality", contemporary East African nationalism seeks to 
display the social and cultural uniqueness of the people 
to the rest of the world. Mini-skirts are banned in Uganda
33
and frowned at in Kenya, Tanzania has recently published 
her "cultural revolution" policy. It rejects not only rad- 
ical Western dressing but outlaws the primitive culture of 
the Masais, Similarly, Nyerere defies capitalism because 
of its emphasis on materialism and its distortion of the 
egalitarian principles of African Society, Conversely,
Jomo Kenyatta and Milton Obote have embraced capitalism 
with qualifications. For them, there is nothing inherently 
bad in it under governmental control and supervision, 
Kenyatta believes that mutual social responsibility con­
ceives of the state as a means by which self-interest is 
harmonized with the general welfare. But generally, all 
the leaders believe that Africaness should not be sacrifi­
ced for political modernization or economic development.
For them, modernization should blend, not destroy African 
identity, traditional values and culture.
33
In a recent debate on cultural nationalism Senator 
Kabaso said in the Kenya Parliament that "Our ministers 
are the worst offenders. They are the policymakers who 
preach African socialism, yet their women have hair that 
looks like sisal," Another Kenya politician, G, Kariuki 
(KANU) declared that wearing of a miniskirt was "just like 
a woman advertising herself, and this is very unfair and 
we cannot tolerate this in our African socialism," See 
Ali A, Mazrui, "Miniskirts and Political Puritanism", 
Africa Report, Vol, 13, No,7, Oct, 1968, p, 12,
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Considering these attempts of leaders to integrate 
political modernization with tradition, one can see the 
inter-relationship between domestic and foreign policies. 
For the decision-makers both foreign and domestic policies 
should enhance the ideals and fruits of independence. 
Unity, political stability, economic developments and se-
h
curity are the basics of domestic policy. Foreign policy 
is a logical extension and tool for achieving the ends.
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"CHAPTER THREE
EAST AFRICAN FEDERATION AND PAN-AFRICANISM
From Tangier or Cairo in the North to Capetown in 
the South, from Cape Guardafui in the East to Cape 
Verde Islands in the West, Africa is one and in­
divisible.
- Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, p. 127.
t-
PAN-AFRICANISM AND THE O.A.U.
The concept of pan-Africanism is almost universally ac­
cepted among African leaders, but its potential lies more 
in the ideal it expresses than in its practicability. As 
an ideal, it is capable of bringing together many leaders 
who embrace conflicting views on almost every issue facing 
Africa. Pan-Africanism has many aspects and interpretat­
ions. The most consistent theme that runs through the lit­
erature on the subject seems to be the general concern 
among African leaders that some form of co-operation is 
necessary to insure the economic development, decoloniza­
tion and political stability of African states.
In the early 196o’s, it was rare for most African lea­
ders to make a speech of any importance without touching 
upon the theme of African unity. Pan-Africanism became 
romanticized. It sought to glorify the African mystique 
of unity and brotherhood. Some leaders propounded theories 
about the necessity of unity. Even with the rapid achie­
vement of independence among African States in I960, the
struggle for unification was intensified; yet there was
- 43
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no consensus on the ideal pan-Africanism. For some leaders 
pan-Afrioanism meant a total political unity of all indep­
endent African states; for others it was a desire for 
functional cooperation on such matters as economic develop­
ment and communication. For example, the All-African
People's Conference which met in Accra, Ghana in 1958 under
»
Tom Mboya of Kenya resolved that:
Pan-Africanism calls for the amalgamation of indepen­
dent African states into regional federations or groupings 
on the basis of geographical contiguity, economic inter­
dependence, and linguistic and cultural affinity, with the 
caveat, however, that the establishment of such regional 
federations should not be prejudicial to the ultimate ob­
jective of a Pan-African Commonwealth. 1
For President Julius Kyerere of Tanganyika pan-Africanism 
meant a political federation of all African states. In 
1 9 6 3, he contended that Africa unity was necessary pre­
requisite for survival. He went on:
For the sake of all African states, large or small, 
African Unity must come and it must be real unity. Our 
goal must be a United States of Africa. Only this can 
really give Africa the future her people deserve after 
centuries of economic uncertainty and social oppression. 
This goal must be achieved and it does not matter whether 
this is done by one step or by many, or through economic, 
political or social development. 2
However, in May, 1963 leaders of twenty-eight African coun­
tries met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to find a more coherent 
definition of pan-Africanism. In a long debate about 
whether or not African countries should adopt a monolithic.
1
2
David K. Marvin, Emerging Africa in World Affairs, Cal­
ifornia, Chandler Publishing Company, Ï9 6 5 , p.73.
Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. I8 9 .
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political amalgamation, Prime Minister Obote of Uganda
spoke in favour of Ghana's proposal for a "strong execu-
3
tive, central government with effective powers". Kenya, 
still a British colony, was represented by Oginga Odinga, 
who was also a representative for the twenty-one nationa­
list parties in dependent states of Africa. He also fav-
»
oured a political unity of African states.
On May 25» the twenty-eight leaders signed the Charter 
of the Organization of African Unity. The Charter repre­
sented, "a compromise between radically differing views of 
African unity, between those who thought of African unity 
as a symbolic and tactical aspect of a revolutionary move­
ment and those who thought of it as an alliance between
sovereign states to protect their newly acquired status in
4
the world community." Among other things, the Charter 
recognized the territorial integrity of each independent, 
sovereign, member state, condemned outside interference in 
thé internal affairs of states and emphasized the need for 
greater understanding and cooperation among the members.
The Charter also expressed the desire for rapid decoloni­
zation in Africa and condemned racial discrimination in 
South Africa.
3
The Africa Institute of International Bulletin, Vol.1, 
Ho.' 6, July 1 9 6 3, p. 153.
4
Immanuel Hallerstein, "The Early Years of the GAU",
International Organization, Volume XX, Ap. 1966,
p. 7 7 4 . ^
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During the Summit meeting, Oginga Odinga, the Vice- 
President of the Kenya African National Union, read a me­
morandum urging that an African Liberation Bureau be set 
up in the capital of an independent African country for the 
purpose of coordinating the liberation struggles of the de­
pendent states in Africa. He also recommended that the 
Conference issue "an ultimatum to all colonial and racist 
powers in Africa to start immediately, the transference of
power to the African peoples in the denendent territories,
„ 5
or else face the consequences . This theme was echoed by 
President Hyerere. As the last head of state to address 
the Conference, he summarized his feelings on pan-Africa­
nism and the need for rapid decolonization in Africa.
In order then to complete this picture of unanimity, 
let me add Tanganyika's voice....At present, not because 
of any greater dedication to the cause of freedom in 
Africa, but because of that proximity to non-independent 
Africa, we are already making a humble contribution to the 
liberation of Southern Africa, but we are prepared to do 
more....I want to assure our gallant brother from Algeria, 
Prime Minister Ben Bella, that we in Tanganyika are pre­
pared to die a little for the final removal of the humi­
liation of colonialism from the face of Africa. 6
Thus, by the end of the Summit Conference at Addis Ababa in
1 9 6 3, pan-Africanism assumed two more distinct forms. First,
as a means of preserving the newly won independence, the
Charter ensures respect for sovereignty and territorial
5
6
Op. cit., p. 1 5 8.
Julius K. Hyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 215.
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integrity of member-states. Second, as a means to combat 
colonialism and imperialism, the Summit called for rapid 
transference of powers to the dependent territories. It 
also pledged specific sums of money and military equipment, 
to nationalist movements through the Liberation Coordinat­
ing Committee. It is significant to note that the East 
African leaders who formerly favoured African unity in 
terms of political amalgamation also came out strongly in 
favour of rapid decolonization. Milton Obote even tried to 
demonstrate his support for liberation forces by offering 
his country as a base for nationalist movements against 
South Africa, Angola, Mozambique and Ehodesia. He said 
that, "if the latter country (Southern Rhodesia) should suc­
ceed in obtaining independence with a white minority govern­
ment all independent African States should break off diplo­
matic relations with the United Kingdom and her fellow-tra- 
7
vellers." Consequently, from the activities of the East
The Africa Institute of International Bulletin, Vol. 1, 
Ho. 6, July 1 9 6 3, p. 1 5 9.
However, it is interesting to note that when, on November 
11» 1 9 6 5, Ian Smith unilaterally declared Rhodesia inde- • 
pendence, only Tanzania of the three East African States 
honoured her pledge to sever diplomatic relations with 
Britain. The extra-ordinary GAU meeting of December 3» 
1965 had adopted a strong resolution in favour of this 
action if Britain failed to crush the Smith Government 
by December 15. Other countries which severed relations, 
with Britain were: Guinea, Ghana, UAR, Mali, Mauritania,
Congo-Brazzaville, Sudan, Algeria and Somalia. Uganda, 
which was the first country to recommend severing of di­
plomatic relations with Britain as a measure of protest 
against the minority government in Rhodesia, clearly 
failed to honour her pledge.
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African States at the first O.A.Ü. Conference at Addis 
Ababa, it would appear that there was a shift in emphasis 
from outright political unity of independent African states 
to total emancipation of the dependent territories.
THE EAST AFRICAN FEDERATION
On June 3, 1963, Prime Ministers Kenyatta and Obote
and President Nyerere jointly declared their intention to
establish a federation by the end of the year. In their
communique at Nairobi, they declared that:
Our meeting is motivated by the spirit of Pan- 
Africanism and not by mere selfish Regional 
interests... We believe that the East African 
Federation can be a practical step towards the 
goal of Pan-African Unity.°
Simultaneously, a timetable was established and a Working 
Party was set up to draft a Federal Constitution. On 
July 31, 1 9 6 3, Jomo Kenyatta expressed the need for fede­
ration when he said that:
This matter of the Federation is particularly 
important to us here in East Africa. We do 
not want to be separated from our brethren by 
artificial frontiers, created at the time of 
Colonialism... We want to move towards that 
unity of the East African people in good order 
and with our administrative machinery geared 
to the great task ahead.9
However, it is questionable whether there was a genuine
political commitment on the parts of Kenyatta and Obote
^ See the complete text of the Communique in Appendix 1. 
^ Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee !. p. 28.
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towards an East African Federation. In fact, a case can 
be made that appeals to Pan-Africanism and the Declaration 
to federate were being used to procure Kenya’s indepen­
dence. Kenya was a British colony at the time the Nairobi
Declaration was signed. An appeal was dispatched to
*
Britain that:
We must declare most strongly our opposition 
to any attempt to delay the country's achieve­
ment of Independence any longer ... We must 
regard it as an unfriendly act if Britain 
uses the pretext of some minority interest 
or other to prevent Kenya joining the free 
nations at the earliest possible moment. We 
are closely involved in this matter now 
since a hold-up in Kenya’s advance to 
Independence will hinder the achievement of 
Federation to which we are committed.10
Soon after the first meeting of the Working Party, Mr. Tom 
Mboya headed a delegation to press the Kenyan demands in 
London. The delegation met with Mr, Duncan Sandys, the 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the 
Colonies., As a result of the meeting, Kenya’s independence 
was set for December 12, 1963. In Mr. Sandys’ report to the
10
Op.cit., Appendix 1
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British House of Commons, he said that the decision of the 
East African States to federate was, "an important new deve­
lopment ... .which has to be taken into account in the tim-
11
ing of Kenya’s independence." He went on that the East 
African Governments had affirmed their intention to esta­
blish a federation before the end of the year and had al­
ready "made substantial progress in working out the cons­
titution", He concluded that it was "in the light of these 
considerations" that such an early date had been set for 
Kenya’s independence.
If the Nairobi Declaration were assessed from the 
point of view of Kenyan decolonization, then, it could be 
assumed that pan-Africanist ideals had been used to advan­
tage. That the Declaration to federate was a strategy 
primarily intended to procure Kenya’s independence could 
also be inferred from Prime Minister Obote's speech to the 
backbenchers' conference in May 1964. Explaining the un­
willingness of Uganda to enter into a political federation 
with other East African States, he said, "the idea of 
Federation had been put forward as an argument to speed 
Kenya's independence....the first objective of the Nairobi 
meeting was to achieve Kenya's independence....regardless
11
J. H. Proctor, Jr., "The Effort To Federate East Africa;
A Post-Mortem", Political Quarterly, Vol. 37, 1966, 
p. 67.
Also see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Britain, 
July 2, 1 9 6 3, Vol. 6 8 0 , Ool. 201 or Jomo Kenyatta, 
Harambee! p. 28,
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12
of what people today are alleging." Jomo Kenyatta seemed
to support this view in his speech at Kisumu Hyansa on
August 2, 1964 when he said that the Declaration of East
African Federation was intended to lure the British Govern-
13
ment to decolonize Kenya, However, President Nyerere,
apparently unimpressed with the interpretations of Prime
Ministers Obote and Kenyatta, said in Dar-es-Salaam in
August 1964, that he had signed the Nairobi Declaration,
"in all honesty, believing that federation was genuinely 
14
wanted." But assuming that Prime Ministers Kenyatta and 
Obote were right, could the "diplomacy of independence" be 
the only motivation for proposals of the East African 
Federation? In the Nairobi Declaration, for example, it 
was mentioned that, "an important factor in view of our 
determination to achieve Federation is the existence of a 
shared currency, a leading aspect of economic working to­
gether is the functioning of the E.A. Common Market".
The Common Market Organization itself was an economic 
institution that was established by the colonial powers in 
1948. It was intended to be a first step towards political 
integration. It operated under a permanent executive au-
12
■ Uganda Argus, Kampala, June 27, 1964.
13
News in Brief, Africa Report, Vol. 9, No. 9, October 
1964, p. 24. Also see All A. Mazrui, "Tanzania 
versus East Africa", Journal of Commonwealth 
Political Studies, Vol'. Ill, 1965, p. 2Ï 3.
14
Tanganyika Standards, Dar-es-Salaam, August 4, 1964.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
thority called the East Africa High Commission, The High 
Commission was composed of the Governors of the three East 
African territories. A Secretariat consisting of the Ad­
ministrator, Legal and Financial Secretaries, the Post­
master General and the Commissioner for Transport was esta­
blished in Nairobi. The immediate goal of the Common Market 
Organization was the promotion of a high degree of economic 
integration i.e. the elimination of duplication in adminis­
tration and of competition in such matters as railway, pos­
tal services, the facilitation of labour mobility and the 
adoption of a common currency and a common market.
After some years, the Organization became the subject
of frequent criticisms. Its' critics contended that the
Organization was specially created to benefit the Kenya
Europeans. So vigorous and disturbing were the criticisms
that Sir Jeremy Haisman was appointed to head a Commission
to investigate the complaints in 1 9 6 0. In its report, the
Commission recommended the "creation of a common pool of
income to compensate Uganda and Tanganyika for the revenues
and employment benefits these two territories customarily
lose through the tendency of new industry to locate near
15
existing industry - i.e. in Kenya." The 1 9 6I recommend­
ations of the Saisman Commission led to the establishment
15
Nye, J.3. Jr., "From Common Market to Federation",
Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 8, August
1 9 6 3, p. 5 ,
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of the Distributable Pool Fund to serve two purposes; "one
was that of providing an independent source of revenue for
the common services; the other was to provide a fiscal re-
16
distribution between the territories."
"When Tanganyika became independent on December 9, 1961, 
there was need for a revitalization of the Common Market 
Organization. The executive authority of the East African 
Common Services Organization (EASCO as it was then called) 
passed to the Chief Ministers of the territories. Four 
ministerial committees were established in charge of Com­
munications, Finance, Commercial and Industrial Co-ordina­
tion, Social and Research Services. Like the former Common 
Market Organization the EASCO was not entirely satisfactory 
and instead of its projected unifying role it served as a 
medium of dissension. Soon after its formation, disputes 
arose over equity - distribution of funds and allocation 
of faculties among the three colleges comprising the Uni­
versity of East Africa, In February 1963, Uganda decided 
to.withdraw from the East African Tourist Travel Associa­
tion because of alleged disparities. Efforts to achieve 
free movement of capital and labour for the realization 
of full benefits from the customs union were already being 
hampered by technical difficulties.
Similarly, there has been reluctance to accept the 
principle that capital generated in one country should be
T6---------
Hazlewood, A., African Integration and Disintegration, 
London, Oxford University Press 1967, p. 72.
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able to move freely within the common market area. A 
Ugandan who announced his intention to invest in Kenya 
early this year ran into severe difficulties with his 
own government.17
Stresses within the common market became more serious 
as industries and commercial activity congregated increa-, 
singly around Nairobi thereby making Uganda and Tanganyika 
equalizing factors seemed to illustrate an imminent col­
lapse of the E.A.S.C.O. and although the Organization it­
self may have been advantageous to the region as a whole 
Tanzania and Uganda were getting disenchanted. Perhaps an 
abandonment of the E.A.S.C.O. would have been more logical 
than its continuation but the leaders, particularly Presi­
dent Nyerere probably thought that a political union and a 
better organized, central economic planning would redress 
the imbalance in the Organization. Therefore, the Nairobi 
Declaration was timely, for the idea of East African 
Federation could be used to de-emphasize regional disparities 
and marshal greater co-operation.
Now, why did the East African leaders fail to agree 
despite the fact that after the first meeting of the 
Working Party for Federal Constitution, the Kenyan Minister
of Justice, Tom Mboya told reporters that "agreements had
1Rbeen reached on every issue".' Four broad reasons can be 
given. Firstly, the leaders of the three states appear 




Tanganyika Standard. (Dar-es-Salaam), June 11, 1963.
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idea. Prime Ministers Obote and Kenyatta seem to have 
put their priorities on Kenyan independence and, there­
fore, regarded the Nairobi Declaration as a form of diplo­
macy to achieve this goal. President Nyerere seems to 
have upheld a different idea. For him the creation of 
the East African Federation was the most essential pur- 
pose of the Nairobi Declaration.
Secondly, constitutional problems began to arise in 
Kampala on June 29, 1963. The Ugandan representative in 
the Working Party, Mr. Nekyon, who was also the Minister 
of Information in his government, gave a formidable list 
of matters, "on which agreement had still to be reached - 
the Civil Service, the selection of a federal capital, 
the number of chambers in the federal legislature and 
the powers they should have, citizenship, the division 
of powers between the federal and state governments with 
respect to foreign affairs, minerals and agriculture and 
whether residual powers should belong to the federal 
government or the states".19
On citizenship, for example, Uganda proposed that 
the East African citizenship be conferred on all citizens 
of the three territories should not become the citizen 
of another; in other words.
19
Colin Leys and Peter Robson, Federation in East Africa; 
Opportunities and Problems. London, Oxford 
University Press, 1965, p. 2.
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East African citizenship was to be merely an expression of 
a loose federation. Kenya and Tanganyika maintained that 
citizenship should be an all-pervading, common denominator 
that would guarantee equal status to every subject irres­
pective of residence. Citizenship and foreign affairs were 
held to be so essential to federation that Minister Kambona
of Tanganyika said, "without these powers, there can be no
20
question of a genuine political association". Uganda den­
ied this and charged others with being too presumptuous in
assuming that "there is a standard model which must be fol-
21
lowed in all cases". Uganda's determination to retain 
power over external relations was also argued with refer­
ence to the already established membership of the inter­
national community and the OAU. Since these Organizations 
recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
member states, Uganda argued that "East Africa's strongest
weapon in international affairs is its three separate votes
22
and voices in the United Nations'-. Kenya and Tanganyika 
rejected these arguments on the ground that federation would 





Government Statement on the East African Federation, 
United Republic of Tanzania Official Report, June 1, 
1964, col. 3461
A. Nekyon, Uganda National Assembly, Official Report, 
June 26, 1964, cols. 1933, 1939-1946.
Ibid, col. 1937.
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• Thirdly, domestic pressures and personality conflicts 
aroused distrust among the leaders. In Uganda, the trad­
itionalist Buganda and the Kabaka wanted to keep their pri­
vileged status and did not want to be assimilated into any 
other federal structure besides Uganda's. In fact, a re­
solution had been passed as far back as January 26, 1963 in 
the Lukiko, (regional legislature) opposing any other pol­
itical union.
Five days after the Nairobi Declaration, a closed ses­
sion of the Lukiko was presented by the Kabaka's Cabinet 
with a statement of policy which viewed East African Fede­
ration with favour on condition that Buganda be one of its 
constituent units. This was said to be necessary to gua­
rantee the future not only of its monarchy and other trad­
itional institutions but also of its very identity. 23
As the Ugandan Federal Government was most unwilling to 
accept the Kabaka's terms, Obote felt compelled to be cau­
tious on negotiations about the East African Federation. 
Similarly, in Kenya, the Kikuyu and the Luo predominant, 
ethnic groups wanted to enter into the federation as sep­
arate, constituent units. They were being supported by the 
KADU opposition party. On June 17, 1964, Jomo Kenyatta told 
the House of Representatives that, "if it was not for a 
KADU nuisance, we would have federated a long time ago....
If it was not for the introduction of majimbo* by KADU,
23
J. H. Proctor, Jr., "The Effort to Federate East Africa", 
Political Quarterly, Volume 37, 1966, p. 62.
* Hajimbo is a Swahili word for provincialism or regional­
ism or tribalism.
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the Federation would have been much easier". But, apart 
from tribal feelings, there were indications of acrimony and 
silent distrust among the various leaders over the race for 
top posts in the proposed federation. Even some of the 
junior leaders were reported to be apprehensive of their 
chances and status if the federation should materialize. 
However, the accusation of personal aggrandizement should 
be directed to the three heads of Government who were more 
disposed to contest for the highest posts in the federation. 
According to J.H. Proctor,
Neither Dr. Nyerere nor Mr. Kenyatta was invulnerable 
to such accusations, for the former was an ardent federal­
ist and the latter was certain to be offered the top posi­
tion in the Federal Government. The reluctance of Dr.
Obote was said by some to be due to his awareness that he 
would be doomed to a distinctly secondary position at the 
federal level since the other two Heads of Government so 
clearly surpassed him in stature.?
When for example, Mr. A. Nekyon expressed the opinion in 
September 1963 that federation would be "practically imp­
ossible" before the end of the year the Financial Times 
correspondent in Nairobi wrote that;
Mr. Nekyon’s statement appears to be a bargaining 
counter rather than a serious threat. But it has brought 
to light the rivalries and fears that plague Uganda's re­
lationship with Kenya both nationally and personally. Now 
that more of the implications of federation are known, 
there is a real fear in Uganda of domination by Kenya. 26
24 Kenyatta, Kenya House of Representatives. Official
Report, June 17. 1964. Cols. 269-271. or see 
Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee I. p. 31.
25 J.H. Proctor, Jr., Political Quarterly, op. cit., p. 61.
26 New in Brief, Africa Report, vol. 8, No. 9, October 1963, 
p. 20.
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Fourthly, the time factor may have become one of the
greatest obstacles to federation. As President Nyerere
prophesied shortly before the Nairobi Declaration, "time
may well not be on the side of federation".
The fact is that there is the right moment for 
everything, and the right moment for unity is 
certainly not after the achievement of separate 
sovereign independence. If separate indepen­
dence is inevitable we should certainly not 
give up trying, but it is going to be much 
harder task to unite our c o u n t r i e s . 27
Nyerere was under no illusion of how difficult negotiations
could be except before all the three countries achieved
independence. Both Uganda and Tanganyika were sovereign
states when the Nairobi Declaration was made in 1963. As
a historian, Nyerere had learnt that federations designed
from previously independent and sovereign units had never
I
really been easy, except those built under an extremely
powerful force. It could hardly be anticipated that force
would ever be used to impose federation in East Africa.
The structure of power, the ostensible pacifist policies
of the three leaders, the diversities in population and
poor logistics inevitably make negotiation as opposed
to confrontation the only vehicle for integration.
Nyerere*s prophesy was right after all. When Mr. A.
Nekyon was giving the report of the Working Party to the
Uganda National Assembly in July 1963, he said:
We are negotiating now as independent states and 
when we sit at the conference table we talk as 
if we are talking at Geneva on disarmament. We
27
Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom ani Unity, p. 98.
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are not talking on friendly terms as relations or 
as clans, but we are speaking as different states 
discussing their own future... We appreciate we 
are brothers but we will do everything in our 
power to see that Uganda gsts her due share irres­
pective of our relations.2°
In addition to the above reasons for the failure of the 
leaders to federate East Africa, one other factor deserves 
to be mentioned, though it is difficult to assess its actual 
significance. There were alleged to be external forces 
opposed to federation. The allegations have not been ade­
quately substantiated but on June 23, 1964, The Nationalist 
paper (Nairobi) accused the United States and Britain of 
sabotage in the materialization of the East African fede­
ration. The paper contended that an East African federation 
would hasten the liquidation of white rule in Rhodesia and 
Mozambique against Western interest. Similarly, Mr. J.S. 
Gichuru, the Kenyan Minister of Finance said that, "it 
was these outside influences which got in our way. If we 
had been left alone, I am quite sure we would have done 
much more up to this m o m e n t " . H o w e v e r ,  it is difficult 
to admit the above allegations of external subversion since 
Britain earlier granted Kenyan independence as a mark of 
support for the proposed federation.
While there has been lack of evidence to support the 
alleged Anglo-American subversion, there is evidence of 
continental disapproval especially from Ghana. Nkrumah's
28
Uganda National Assembly. Official Report. July 12, 1963, 
Co1,~ÏÔ46.
29
EasU African Common Services Organization, Proceedings of 
the Central Legislative Assembly Debates. Nairobi, January 
16, 1964, Col. 1428.
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lofty ideas of pan-Africanism did not admit of regional
integration as proposed by the East African leaders. In
his book on Africa Must Unite, he wrote in particular
reference to the federation that:
In order to improve effectively and quickly 
the serious damage done to Africa as a result 
of imperialism and colonialism, the emergent 
African States need strong, unitary states 
capable of exercising a central authority for 
the mobilization of the regional effort and 
the co-ordination of reconstruction and progress.
For this reason, I consider that even the idea of 
regional federations in Africa is fraught with 
many dangers. There is the danger of the develop­
ment of regional loyalties fighting against each 
other. In effect, regional federations are a 
form of balkanization on a grand scale.30
Nkrumah's disapproval of the East African federation was 
also expressed with charges of a neo-colonialist plot inten­
ding to perpetuate Western hegemony in Africa. Consequently, 
efforts to federate in East Africa were bitterly attacked 
by the Government-controlled newspapers in Accra while the 
"Ghanaian officials in East Africa engaged in an unrestrained 
public diplomatic offensive as well as clandestine lobbying 
against the project".31
Now it seems that economic and social forces are not 
automatically leading to political unification but leaders 
have not given up all hopes. In the words of President
30
Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, London, Heinemann 
Educational Books Ltd., 1963, P- 2l4.
31 Thomas M. Franck, East African Unitv Through Law, New
Haven, Yale University Press, 1964, p. 161.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6lb
Kenyatta:
It is true we made a declaration that we were going 
to federate at the end of 1963, but it was impossible 
to do so at that time. We as a Government have laid 
down our plans, but we cannot do all things we have 
promised overnight. Even angels could not do this.
It is impossible for me to give you the date when 
Federation will be.32
However, if this remark is not entirely a gloomy appraisal
32
Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee !, p. 32.
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of past efforts to federate, it is a reflection of the in­
tractable problems that had beset the paths of unity. Lay­
ing the foundation stone of the East African Common Services 
Organization regional headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam on July 
15, 1 9 6 5, President Nyerere noted:
The failure of East Africa to federate is a great 
shame. So, I repeat, we prefer federation. But if our 
neighbours prefer a looser form of cooperation in the form 
of the Common Market and the Common Services, I pledge 
Tanzania's full cooperation in maintaining them. 33
By 1966 there grew the impression that the best that could
be expected of the former grandiose attempt to federate was
greater economic cooperation among the states. Therefore,
on June 6 , 1 9 6 7, Kenyatta, Obote and Nyerere signed a treaty
of economic cooperation in Kampala which became operative
on December 1, 1 9 6 7. The treaty established a Community
between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda for the purpose of bring-
34
ing balanced development to the three countries. The 
treaty should be seen essentially as a corrective measure 
that is designed to remove the imbalance and inequity which 
constituted the weaknesses of the EASCO. It allows the use 
of a transfer tax as an instrument for controlling indus­
trial development. Under the transfer tax system, a member 
state whose total trade in manufactured goods is in deficit
33
34
News in Brief, Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 9, Oct. 1965,
p. 59.
See Appendix II.
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with- the other states can impose tariffs on imports from any 
of the states. The treaty also allows decentralization or 
services and operations so that partner states could bene­
fit from staff and organization managements.
By far the most important parts of the Treaty are 
those establishing the common market, a method of counter­
acting some of the existing economic imbalances between the 
partner states, and the supra-national institutions that 
are to administer the market, for between them they create 
a completely new framework for the continuation of economic 
cooperation between the three East African countries and 
have the potential of limiting each country's freedom to 
pursue its economic policies to a much greater extent than 
has hitherto been the case. 35
The two important supra-national institutions consist of 
the Common Market Council and the Common Market Tribunal,
The Council is charged with keeping the operation of the 
Treaty under constant review and making sure that member 
states keep to their pledge. Questions concerning the ob­
servance and interpretation of the treaty may be taken to 
a judicial body, the Common Market Tribunal. It also in­
vestigates irregularities of partner states and acts as 
advisory body to the Council. It may be, therefore, that 
the immediate importance of the treaty rests mainly on its 
demonstration of the desire for continued and extended co­
operation.
From the inception of the Common Market, Ethiopia, 
Zambia and neighbouring Somalia have been expressing their
35
W. B. McAuslan, "Recent Developments In Tanzania ,
World Today, Vol. 24, No. 1, January 
1968, p. 31.
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desire to be full members. While Kenya, Uganda and Tanza­
nia are still discovering what the Community really means 
to their economies and political policies, they may hesi­
tate to complicate Issues by admitting new members. How­
ever, it is almost certain that because of the fragile po­
litical situations in East Africa, the only thing that can 
be expected of the original attempt to federate is this by­
product of economic association, at least for sometime to 
come.
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CHAPTER IV
ATTITUDES TO OTHER AFRICAN STATES
We have to accept Africa as it is, and not imagine 
that we have any more right to interfere with the 
internal affairs of others than they have to inter­
fere in ours....But we must be ready to co-operate 
with all African states in African affairs, regard­
less of our opinion of their internal - or even ex­
ternal policies. "
-Julius K. Nyerere, Tanzania Policy on Foreign
Affairs, p. 15.
East African relations with other African states are
difficult to evaluate in precise terms. Although, official
continental policies are couched in brotherhood solidarity
phrases, inter-governmental relations are hampered by poor
communications. For economic reasons, few Embassies are
established in other African countries. Official state
visits are made to few "friendly" states. In fact, before
the inauguration of the "Good Neighbor" Conference of 1966,
the East African states had very little contact with other
African.countries. The OAU forum at Addis Ababa was the
only link enabling the East African leaders to be in touch
with fellow African politicians. Close to home, goodwill
was degenerating as a result of border problems and/or
territorial disputes between Kenya and Somalia Republic,
Uganda and her neighbours. This chapter will attempt to
show the East African responses to border problems and the
extent to which OAU resolutions have affected foreign policy
and attitudes of the East African states to three African
crises.
65
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BORDER PROBLEMS, TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND NEIGHBOURLINESS 
One of the most interesting and paradoxical phases of 
pan-Africanism is probably the outcome of the O.A.U. summit 
meeting of May 1963 which gave some impetus to nationalist 
feelings and irredentism in respect to the colonial-drawn 
African boundaries. The peaceful tone of the summit meet­
ing was interrupted when President Osman of Somalia rose to 
attack the host Emperor Selassie for refusing to grant a 
plebiscite to the Somali people on the Ethiopian borders
Asserting his belief that the problem of Africa's mis- 
drawn boundaries was a proper subject for debate at 
the Conference, he said there could be no unity as long 
as these problems remained. For a moment the fate of 
the Conference hung in the balance as the Emperor arose, 
indignant over this slur.1
President Houphouet-Boigny, the chairman of that particular 
session of the conference quickly intervened by sharply 
criticizing the Somali action. "Modibo Keita of Mali ex­
pressed the opinion of many delegations in asking that the 
conference should not be spoiled by this incident and urging
p
that the present frontiers in Africa be maintained". This 
speech was warmly applauded by delegates to the conference 
and Somalia seemed to have lost all African support for her 
boundary agitation.
In 1964 the Somali Government made another claim that
Norman J. Padelford, "The Organization of African Unity", 
International Organization. Volume XVIII, No. 3, 
Summer, 1964, p. 532.
A.A. Castagno, "Somali-Kenyan Controversy: The Future", 
The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 2,
No. 2, July 1964, p. IP2 .
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"all Somali peoples living outside the nation-state have a
right to self-determination, and thus the right to become
3
part of Somalia if they so wish". This appeal was being c
directed to the Somalis inhabiting the Northern Frontier
District (N,F,D,) of Kenya, The area is about 102,000
square miles and includes the dominantly Somali-inhabited
land of Mandera Wajio and Garissa with the mainly Galla
districts of Marsabit, Isiolo and Moyale, Since I960 when
Somalia became independent, the N,F,D, has become the centre
of controversy between Kenya and Somalia, The Somalis think
that the division of their land and people has been the fault
of colonial powers which created arbitrary boundaries that
defied enthographic logic. On their part, the Kenyans feel
that the border problem directly affects national interests
that "even to recognize that boundaries are negotiable would
4
itself constitute a threat to the country's integrity".
However, the Somalis who constitute the bulk of the popula- 
5
tion have been deeply resentful of the Kenyan claims. They 
have demanded secession from Kenya and unity with Somalia, 
Their feeling of alienation and resentment towards Kenya 
is accentuated by the steady social and economic developments
John Howell, "Analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy", The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol, 6, îîo, 1, 
1968, p, 37.
Ibid, p, 41,
The total population of the N.F,D, was estimated in 1962 
to be 388,000 out of which about 240,000 were considered 
to be Somalis, Ibid, p, 38,
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in Somalia relative to N.F.D. and accompanied by constant
doses of virulent propaganda^ from Radio Mogadishu, They
also claim that the Kenyan Government has neglected them
for a long time. For example, Ahmed Farah, the Somali
Legislative Council representative is quoted as saying
in the I96O London Constitutional Conference that:
Sometimes the people of the N.F.D. think of the rest 
of Kenya as quite a foreign country. They have little 
in common with the rest of Kenya....I had better say 
what will happen if the administration of the Northern 
Province is not changed. I foresee that the Somali 
and Boran and the Galla and the Turkans....will break 
away in different directions./
When Kenya became independent in 1963, the Somalis in the
N.F.D. began to organize armed, insurgent movements called
shifta with the support of the Somali Government. In his
parliamentary speech on February 26, 1964, Jomo Kenyatta
reported that,
Early in January, gang attacks stopped in the border 
area, but several gangs penetrated deep into the North 
Eastern Region, where they made well organized and con­
certed attacks on patrols and camps. The whole pattern 
changed as civilians in the Region were attacked, presu­
mably to instill fear into the local population, to pro­
mote a policy of non-cooperation with the Kenya Govern­
ment and Security forces....There is no doubt at all 
that the Somalia Government's policy of territorial 
expansion has led to the killing of peaceful Kenya 
citizens, straining our relations with that Government.
7
In his speech to the National Assembly on February 26, 
1964, Jomo Kenyatta spoke of "propaganda by Mogadishu 
Radio and the policy of territorial expansion practised 
by the Government of Somalia", Harambee!, p. 39. Also 
see Colin Legum, "Somali Liberation Songs", The Journal 
of Modern African Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4, March, 1963.
A.A. Castagno, "Soraali-Kenyan Controversy'.', p. 175*
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Mindful of this country's obligations in the maintenance 
of peace and security, and in accordance with their own 
declaration, the Kenya Government raised the matter in an 
emergency Council of Ministers meeting of O.A.U. held in 
Dar-es-Salaam two weeks ago. The Council decided to in­
clude the matter on the Agenda of its meeting now under 
way in Lagos.°
Until 1967 when a change in the Somali Government was ef­
fected and Mohamed Egal became Prime Minister, O.A.U. in­
itiative at mediation was unsuccessful. Somalia wanted 
the O.A.U. to conduct a referendum on self-determination 
of the Somalis in N.F.D. Kenya insisted that she would not 
allow any part of her territory to be dismembered and would 
defend her "territorial integrity by every means". In I966 
Dr. Mungai, then Minister of Defense, said that, "our con­
tention is borne out by the resolutions of both O.A.U. and 
the Conference of the nonaligned nations held in Cairo in 
1 9 6 5. Both Conferences agreed that the territorial inte­
grity of the present African states must be maintained".^ 
Thus, the border dispute between Kenya and Somalia arose 
from conflicts in the application of Somalia's conception 
of self-determination and Kenya's desire to retain the col­
onial status quo in boundary arrangements. When the O.A.U. 
intervened again in October 19&7, a Working Committee was 
established under President Kaunda of Zambia charged with 
periodic review of the Somali-Kenyan relationship for the
g
Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee!, pp. 39-41.
9 John Howell, "Kenyan Foreign Policy", Journal of Modern 
African Studies, p. 40.
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purpose of promoting understanding between the two disput­
ing countries. Since then relations between the two coun­
tries have improved considerably.
In Tanzania, the dispute with Malawi is territorial.
It arose on September 11, 1968 when Dr. Hastings Banda was 
addressing a rally at Chitopwa, Malawi. Pointing to a 
part of the Tanzanian territory, he said, "That is my land 
over there and these people - Tukuyu, Njombe and Songea - 
are my subjects. All of them must be given back; the 
British had no business to give away the land to someone 
else".^® A week later, during the opening session of the 
annual convention of the malawi Congress Party, Dr. Banda 
reiterated his claim also to the whole of neighbouring 
Zambia's Eastern Province. In Tanzania, the Government 
dismissed Dr. Banda's claim as "insane, absurd and highly 
provocative". The condemnation went on:
When Tanzania repudiates Dr. Banda's claims, she 
cannot ignore his words on the grounds that they have been 
uttered by an insane person, because the powers behind the 
so-called Ngwazi (Lion) are not insane. In the world today, 
there are many countries which are either under the direct 
control of the imperialists or have their leadership mani­
pulated by foreign remote control. '^
While it is difficult to explain objectively why Dr. Banda 
chose this time to make his claim on sections of Zambia and 
Tanzania territories. Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda of
Government of Tanzania, "Dr. Banda's Expansionist Claims", 
United Republic of Tanzania News Bulletin, No. 5, 
Dar-es-Salaam, September 1968, p. 1.
 ^^ Ibid., p. 2.
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Zambia alleged that Dr. Banda has been egged on by forces
of the Lisbon-Pretoria-Salisbury axis. In fact, Tanzania
thinks that the appointment of a high ranking Military
Attache by South Africa to "a tiny country like Malawi is
proof that Malawi is a strategic spying post for South
1 PAfrica and Rhodesia". Consequently, Dr. Banda is regard-
a-
ed as a saboteur of African efforts to liberate dependent 
territories in South Africa.
Of the three East African states, however, Uganda has 
the most unusual form of border problems. Because of her 
landlocked geographical position, she shares common borders 
with many neighbours -Rwanda, Congo, Kenya and Tanzania. 
While these countries have not formally laid claims to any 
part of the Ugandan territory, the backlash of their dom­
estic problems have usually affected Uganda. In a speech 
in Entebbe on August 3, 1968, Foreign Minister Odaka re­
marked:
A pattern has arisen whereby whenever there are dist­
urbances in one of the neighbouring countries, refugees 
pour into Uganda. Some of these refugees attempt to carry 
out subversive activities against their countries of origin 
and sometimes Uganda villages and border posts are attacked 
by legal and illegal forces from neighbouring countries. 
Uganda for instance witnessed this pattern of events on the 
Rwanda, Congo and Sudan borders and the only time there is 
relative calm on any of our borders is when there is peace 
and stability in the country that shares that border. 13
12 Ibid.. p. 2.
^ S.N. Odaka, Speech on Geography as a Determinant of
Uganda's Foreign Policy. Entebbe, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 1968, p. 6.
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Thus, as a matter of necessity and in response to the refu­
gee problems, Uganda has been trying to develop and streng­
then relations with the neighbouring countries since the 
Second Congo erruptions of 1964. Kenya and Tanzania have 
joined in on the assumption that.
If Tanzania works in harmony with Kenya and with Zambia, 
then Kenya and Zambia are linked together. If Kenya then 
co-operates with Ethiopia^ then Tanzania and Zambia are both 
linked to Ethiopia - and so on throughout our continent.... 
When these exist, then.all-African meetings can facilitate 
and speed developments. If these do not exist, then the 
all-Africa meetings have to devote their time to patching 
and mending the torn fabric of cooperation, instead of help­
ing the move forward.14
In an attempt to formalize this setting of special relation­
ship, the first "Good Neighbor" meeting of the East and 
Central African heads of statesl^ was held in Nairobi on 
March 31 to April 2, 1966. It operated without an agenda 
and a "spokesman emphasized that no attempt was made to 
form a regional grouping or to usurp the functions of the 
O.A.U."."^^ In his evaluation. President Nyerere claimed 
that :
Indeed the Tanzania delegation was unanimously of the 
opinion that we had never attended a more useful and cons­
tructive political gathering. Of course, that meeting did 
not solve all the problems of this part of Africa; some of 
them are too deep-seated and too complicated to be suscep­




J.K. Nyerere, Tanzania Policy on Foreign Affairs, Dar-es- 
Salaam Information Services Division, 1967, p. 17.
The countries comprise of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Cen­
tral African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, 
Rwanda, Sudan, Zambia, Ethiopia, Somali Republic and 
Burundi.
Good Neighbor Summit, Africa Report, Vol.1l, No. 5,
May 1 9 6 6, p. 1 5 .
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atmosphere in which problems could be tackled; it did con­
tribute greatly to our common progress. 17
After the meeting, Obote invited President Mobutu of Congo-
Leopoldville to visit Uganda for a one-day discussion on
refugee problems. Both leaders agreed that they would
allow greater freedom of movements for nationals on either
side of their borders. *■
The third of the "Good Neighbor" Summit meetings of the
East and Central African heads of states was held in Kampala
on December 15-16, 1967 after the second meeting which was
held in Congo-Kinshasa late in 1966. In his opening address
Obote appealed to his fellow heads of states for greater
co-operation. He concluded by saying that "as good neighbours
we aim at removing obstacles that tend to separate us from .
each other. We strive to develop resources that are of
mutual benefit to us all. We unite to face challenges that
threaten our sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is
in this that I see the emergence of a strong, viable and
1Rmeaningful co-operation". However, from the reports of 
the last meeting held in Dar-es-Salaam from May 13-15, 1968, 
it would seem that the deliberations of the "Good Neighbor" 
summit meetings are gradually extending to continental pro­
blems. The communique of the Dar-es-Salaam meeting, for 
example, "welcomed current efforts to find a peaceful
17
18
J.K. Nyerere, Tanzania Policy on Foreign Affairs, p. l8.
Milton Obote, "Good Neighbor" Summit, Africa Report.
Vol. 13, No. 2, February 1968, p. 25»
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solution to the Nigerian conflict; noted with concern the 
deteriorating situation in Rhodesia and agreed on making 
representations to states aiding Rhodesia, South Africa 
and Portugal, called for the expulsion of South Africa from 
the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development; and reaf­
firmed their support for the liberation movements in South- 
ern Africa". 1^ fjo doubt, reports of the success of the East 
and Central African "Good Neighbor" meetings have improved 
intra-state communications now extending to other members 
of the O.A.U. family.
THREE CRISES - CONGO, NIGERIA, ARAB-ISRAELI
While most African countries are in the initial stage 
of political development, one of the pre-occupations of the 
O.A.U. is to regulate the involvement of outside powers in 
the African continent. The Congo crisis and the Nigerian 
civil war are cases that illustrate this phenomenon.
At the first outbreak of the Congo crisis in I960, no 
East African state was independent, the O.A.U. had not been 
formed and independent African states operated in splinter 
groups. When the crisis opened up again in 1964, Kenya was 
one of the newly independent African countries. The lead­
ing members of the ruling KANU party expressed strong nation­
alist feelings against outside intervention in African af-
19
"Good Neighbor" Summit, Africa Report, Vol. 13, No. 7, 
October 1968, p. 25.
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fairs. Joseph Murumbi the Minister for External Affairs,
launched a bitter attack on western policy:
We consider that the recent military intervention moun­
ted by the United States and Belgium with the collaboration 
of the United Kingdom, constitutes unwarranted influence in 
African affairs.a flagrant violation of the United Nations 
Charter, a threat to the peace and security of the African 
continent and a calculated attempt to undermine African 
unity, 20
In September 1964, an : Ad hoc Conciliation Commission was
appointed by the O.A.U. in Addis Ababa with the mandate to
finding "ways and means to effect national reconciliation
within the Congo and the normalization of relations between
21
Congo-Leopoldville and its neighbors", Jomo Kenyatta was 
named as head for the Commission. On September l8, 1964, 
the meeting of the ad hoc Commission was held in Nairobi 
and an appeal was made for cessation of hostilities in the 
Congo. Later the Commission decided that, "all white mer­
cenaries and foreign troops should be withdrawn forthwith
from the Congo and that all foreign interventions should
22
cease immediately". The Commission also dispatched an 
unsuccessful mission to ask President Johnson to end U.S. 
military intervention in the Congo. But whether or not the
O.A.U. mediation and initiative were effective is not the 
focus of the Congo crisis, nor of this analysis; what is
-'1
John Howell, "Kenyan Foreign Policy", Journal of Modern 
African Studies, p. 31.
Joseph Murumbi - Kenya, Plenary Meeting of the U.N. Gen­
eral Assembly, 19th' Session (English) Dec. 7, 1964, 
A/PV. 1293, pp. 8-10,
Ibid, pp. 8-10.
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significant is the unanimous African resentment towards out­
side intervention. The following speeches of the other two 
East African states to the U.N. General Assembly of December 
1964 would illustrate this.
1. My country (Tanzania) was shocked and horrified 
that at the very time that the O.A.U, was seeking an African 
solution, at the very time that the ad hoc Commission was 
establishing its competence, certain non-African Powers 
thought it fit to frustrate the efforts of the O.A.U. by 
unwarranted military intervention. This military interven­
tion....is a clear affront to the O.A.U. and shamefully de­
tracts from the U.N. efforts in the Congo during the past 
four years. My country, therefore, earnestly requests those 
foreign Powers intervening with their troops, arms and mer­
cenaries to withdraw all these unwanted instruments of neo­
colonialism and allow the Congolese people, and only the 
Congolese people, and their African brothers to settle the 
problems facing them in an African manner, by themselves. 23
2. The Uganda delegation appeals to all outside Powers 
involved in the Congo situation to use their influence to 
end the fighting which has resulted in the unnecessary loss 
of so many lives. It is also vital that the white mercena­
ries should be withdrawn, in order to give the Reconcilia­
tion Commission a chance to tackle the problem. 24
The Nigerian civil war is another classic example of how
African states deplore outside intervention in continental
matters. T'hen the war started in 1964, Nigeria identified
the pattern of the crisis with that of the Congo, Ojukwu
with Tshombe and the secessionist Biafra with Katanga. At
the O.A.U. summit in Congo-Kinshasa in September 1967, a
23
Karabona-Tanzania, Plenary Meeting of the U.N. General
Assembly! 19th Session (English) December 
To, 1964, A/PV.1293, p. 77,
24
Odaka-Uganda, U.N. General Assembly Debates, December
7, T964, A/PV.1293, p. 77.
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Consultative Committee of six Heads of States was appointed 
under Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia to help Nigeria 
bring an end to the conflict. In setting up the Committee, 
the O.A.U. affirmed its support for the territorial inte­
grity of Nigeria and admitted the internal character of the
conflict. In addition, most African states blamed external
»
interests for the causes of the civil war. In Uganda,
Foreign Minister S. N. Odaka said that:
The tragedies that have befalled Nigeria have come 
because international involvement has highlighted differ­
ences and exaggerated not only the differences of tribe and 
religion existing in that country but gone out of their way 
to illuminate the already enlarged identification tags.... 
Some enthusiastic men have even attempted to equate the 
plight of Ibos^S as similar in every respect to that of the 
Jews. We have been told that they are a persecuted tribe 
and race. 26
However, not all African states would interpret the Nigeri-
27
an civil war in the same perspective as Uganda. President 
Nyerere has vigorously protested that external factors were 
responsible for the Congo crisis whereas, in Nigeria, seces­
sion was roused by internal forces. Therefore, "Presidents 




The Ibos constitute the predominant ethnic group in the 
secessionist province. By the 1964 Nigerian census fi­
gures, the Ibos numbered 8.2 million of the 13 million 
people in the region.
S. N. Odaka, Speech on Our Institutions and Foreign 
Aspects, Entebbe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
19SB, p. 4.
Four countries have recognized the secessionist Nigeri­
an sta.te-Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon": and Ivory Coast,
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civil war undermines the claims that they are pressing on
the front line in Southern Africa....Their argument goes,
accept the division of Nigeria and concentrate on the more
28
important task in hand in Southern Africa". In fact, in 
recognizing the secessionist state. President Nyerere ex­
plained that:
For 10 months we have accepted the Nigerian Government's 
legal right to our support in a "police action to defend the 
integrity of the State". On that basis, we have watched a 
civil war result in the death of about 100,000 people, and 
the employment of mercenaries by both sides. ¥e watched the 
federal government reject the advice of Africa to talk 
instead of demanding surrender before talks could, begin. 
Everything combined gradually to force us to the conclusion 
that Nigerian unity did not exist. 29
In spite of whatever compassion and the good intentions that 
Nyerere must have had towards Biafra his recognition of sec­
ession is regarded by most African states as an open viola­
tion of the O.A.U. resolution which recognized the Nigerian 
civil war as a domestic problem. Most Africans believe that 
the balkanization of Africa would invite chaos, therefore, 
territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-interference in 
domestic affairs of member states have remained sacrosanct 
in the O.A.U. Charter.
At the O.A.U. Summit in Algiers in September 1968, the 
four countries which recognized Biafra found themselves in
28
Note of the Month, "The O.A.U. and the Nigerian Issue",
World Today, Vol. 24, No. 11, November 1968, p. 450.,
29
Why Tanzania Recognized Biafra, Africa Report, Vol. 13, 
No. 6, June 1968, p. 27.
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a difficult situation. Strong denunciations were made of
the "imperialist attempt to divide Nigeria hy leaders of
30
impeccable African record like President Keita" and Pre­
sident Houari Boumedienne of Algeria, Of the four countries 
which recognized Biafra, only President Kaunda of Zambia 
attended the Conference as head of his country's delegation; 
others were represented on the ministerial level. Even 
President Kaunda had to leave early and protested "at being 
lumped with the imperialists". At the end of the summit, a 
resolution was passed which "appeals to the secessionist
leaders to cooperate with the Federal authorities in order
31
to restore peace and unity in Nigeria". In asserting 
Kenya's support for the resolution, Arwings-Kodhek, Minis­
ter of State in the Office of the Kenyan President said in 
the U.N. General Assembly on October 15, 1968 that:
I should now like to make reference to a special Afric­
an problem, which for more than a year has been the focal 
point while external arms and ammunition have been clash­
ing. I refer, of course, to Nigeria. It is barely three 
weeks since we came to some understanding on this African 
problem at the O.A.U. Summit in Algiers. It is lamentable 
that outsiders are still active in that African country. 32
However, thé unequivocal support given to Nigeria by Kenya, 
Uganda and many African states may not necessarily be con­
strued as a reflection of deep allegiance to the O.A.U.
30
Op. cit.. p. 4 5 0 .
31
O.A.U. Resolution on Nigeria, Africa Report, Vol. 13,
No. 8, November 1968, p. 21.
32
Arwings-Kodhek, M.P. -Kenya, Soeech to the 23rd Session 
of the U.N. General Assembly. Kenya Mission to 
the U.N., Information Section, Oct. 15, 1968, p.7.
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resolution. For example, these countries did not break 
diplomatic relations with Britain in accordance with the 
O.A.U. resolution on Rhodesia. The fact on Nigeria is that 
most African countries, particularly Uganda and Kenya, are 
apprehensive of laying a precedence: for possible secessio­
nist tendencies in other parts of Africa. This has been
». ■
the trump card of Nigerian diplomacy.
Although the East African states were not unanimous 
in their support of the O.A.U. interpretation of the Nigerian 
civil war, on the Arab-Israeli conflict, they fully endorsed 
O.A.U. resolutions. Before the 1967 war, Israel had esta­
blished considerable influence in sub-Saharan Africa. In 
an attempt to offset the geo-political Arab advantage in 
Africa, Israel maintained embassies in every country except 
Somalia and Mauritania. Israeli experts were helping to 
train the Ugandan pilots, youth-mobilizing and agrarian 
centred movements along Israeli model were established in 
Tanzania, joint stock companies were formed in Kenya. In 
effect, Israeli influence was increasing as many African 
leaders were getting ambivalent of Arab position in Africa. 
This phenomenon still affected the attitudes of Uganda in 
1968 as could be illustrated from the speech of Foreign 
Minister, S.N. Odaka, in Entebbe.
In the north, we find countries which belong to two 
different worlds. It has been authoritatively stated and 
is a well-known fact that such countries as Egypt and for 
that matter Sudan at our border, are both African and 
therefore members of the O.A.U. and members of the Arab 
League and simultaneously involved in the Middle East pol­
itics and conflicts, including the Arab Israeli conflict.
To make natters worse, unlike Uganda, these countries in 
their foreign policies place majoi emphasis on religious
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considerations since they are part of the Islamic world. 33 
Immediately after the Arab-Israeli June war of 1967, Afric­
an attitudes began to change from former ambivalence or pro- 
Israel to outright sympathy for the Arab underdog. The be­
lief that the first shot was probably fired by Israel and 
the apparent Israeli unwillingness to surrender occupied 
areas strongly reinforced African suspicion of Israeli im­
perialism. In the O.A.U. Summit at Kinshasa on September
23, 1 9 6 7, the Middle East situation was discussed and a re-
34
solution was passed expressing "sympathy for the U.A.R.", 
but the O.A.U. agreed only to work through the United Rat­
ions to help the U.A.R. to recover its occupied territories. 
In Tanzania, President Nyerere said that:
The establishment of the State of Israel was an act of 
aggression against the Arab People. It was connived at by 
the international community because of the history of per­
secution against the Jews. We recognize Israel and wish to 
be friendly with her as well as with the Arab nations. But 
we cannot condone aggression on any pretext, nor accept vic­
tory in war as a justification for the exploitation of other 
lands, or government over other peoples. 35
Julius Nyerere even sent a cable to President Nasser offer­
ing aid "in,defense of your rights against imperialism".
In the U.N. General Assembly, Kenya decried the effects of 
the closure of the Suez Canal on her economy. On the pol­
itical aspect of the war, Arwings-Kodhek said.
33
S. Odaka, Speech on Geography As a Determinant of 
Uganda's Foreign'Policy, Entebbe, 19 6 8 , p .3.
34
O.A.U. at Kinshasa, Africa Report, Vol. 12, No. 7, Oct.
1967, p; 25.
35
J. K . Nyerere, Tanzania policy on Foreign Affairs, pp.6-7.
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The Government of Kenya proceeds from the belief that 
all states have a right to exist. We do not share the phi­
losophy of permanent belligerency now maintained against 
Israel by some of her neighbors. On the other hand, the 
Government of Kenya cannot support the further occupation 
by Israel of Arab territory it brought under its control 
during the six-day war. The language of the United Nations 
Charter is clear and unequivocal on the question of terri­
torial aggrandisement; as we have already reminded the 
Assembly, it urges its signatories to refrain from the ac­
quisition of foreign territory through conquest. 36
When the Middle East conflict came up again at the O.A.U. 
Summit in Algiers in September 1968, the three East Afric­
an states unanimously voted along with other thirty-three 
states to adopt a resolution which "reaffirms support for 
the U.A.R., calls for the withdrawal of foreign troops from 
Arab territories occupied since June 5, 1967 in accordance 
with the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22,
1967 and appeals to all members to apply this resolution 
37
strictly". However, the resolution did not condemn or 
mention Israel by name, neither had the diplomatic relations 
between the East African states and Israel changed too dra­
matically. In fact, Israel has not broken diplomatic rela­
tions with any African state in protest against the O.A.U. 
resolution.
Finally, two conclusions can be drawn from the above 
analysis of the East African reactions to African problems. 
Firstly, that border disputes can best be solved through
36
37
Arwings-Kodhek, Speech to the U.N. General Assembly,
'pp. 8-9.
Middle East O.A.U. Resolution, Africa Report. Vol. 13,
No. 8, November 1968, p. 21.
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improved communications with neighbouring states. This was 
demonstrated by the success of President Obote in discus­
sing refugee problems with President Mobutu of Congo-Leop­
oldville after the first meeting of the "Good Neighbor" 
Meeting in 1966, Secondly, that O.A.U. resolutions have, 
to varying degrees, affected the general attitudes of the 
East African states in respect to outside interventions and 
continental policies. This is evident from the violent con­
demnation of outside intervention in the case of the Congo 
and the unanimous support for the U.A.R. after the O.A.U. 
resolution on the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the Nigerian 
crisis, opinions of the East African leaders differ but 
Kenya and Uganda have subscribed to the O.A.U. idea that 
secession should be discouraged in any independent African 
country.
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CHAPTER V
EAST AFRICA AND THE WORLD
The African has, as you know, a pride and determina­
tion that his new status will have its own African 
character. He will not imitate the East any more 
than he will the West. »fhile he may draw from other 
societies, the end-product will have a distinct Afri­
can character.'
- G. Mennen Williams, Documents on Modern Africa,
p. 142.
One of the most important results of the epochal de­
colonization in East Africa has been the responsibility im­
posed on the leaders for the formulation of policies that 
relate to their external affairs. For these leaders, for­
eign policy is the continuation of the task of state-build­
ing. The conduct of external relations is a test of poli­
tical maturity and an expression of the nation's independ­
ence within the international community. Membership to the 
United Nations and participation in the deliberations of 
its various bodies, exchange of protocol and diplomatic re­
cognition from foreign governments, attendance at other in­
ternational gatherings and opportunity for the free expres­
sion of views on international issues are regarded as leg­
itimate symbols of state sovereignty and prestige.
In this chapter, attempts shall be made to analyze the
1
The quotation is from the speech: "American Policy in 
Africa Explained by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs", given before the African Studies 
Association on October 12, 1962 and edited by T. Walter 
Wallbank in Documents on Modern Africa, New Jersey, D.
Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964, p. l42.
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foreign policy of the East African states in respect to non- 
alignment, general attitudes to the East and West including 
the Commonwealth, and the policy towards the United Nations 
as a world organization. Continental policies of unity and 
good neighbourliness have been examined in the preceeding 
chapters, however, I shall feel free to elaborate the ex-
s­
tent to which commitments to decolonization have affected
relations with the West.
IHECRT CP NONALIGNMENT
Insofar as foreign policy helps to provide a medium of 
asserting national identity, for the new states, nonalign­
ment presents an attractive policy for maximizing advanta­
ges and yet maintaining independent status from the former 
colonial power. In East Africa, nonalignment is the logical 
acceptance of the traditional doctrine of sovereignty and 
of attempts to apply it to contemporary international af­
fairs ,
But non-alignment has often suffered from lack of pre­
cise definition. Some people speak of "non-commitment" 
others of "positive neutralism" and still others speak of 
"dynamic neutrality". To label the non-alignment policy 
of the East African states as neutrality would be very mis­
leading. This is because neutrality does not clearly des­
cribe the policies of smaller countries in relation to a 
power-rivalry especially in time of peace. It may, however, 
refer to the policies of such a country as Switzerland which 
has consistently followed its neutrality in war and in peace
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,times. In East Africa, non-alignment is not neutrality as 
such; neither is it really non-commitment. Nonalignment 
is a sort of insurance policy, guaranteeing an uninhibited 
voice on international issues and allowing the countries 
to stress their claim to uniqueness. For example, the po­
licy of the Kenya African National Union states that;
f.
Nonalignment is not based on Kenya's desire to be left 
alone, but on a desire to be taken notice of. Our policy 
is one of nonalignment, not noncommitment. We fully commit 
ourselves to support what is right and just in internation­
al affairs. 2
Oginga Odinga, leader of the Kenya People's Union, provides 
another definition that draws on the realities of the power 
blocs and the role of nonalignment policy. "Nonalignment, 
let us remember, means that we shall tie ourselves to no 
power bloc; and that while we shall not necessarily.opt 
for neutrality on every issue, ours will be the freedom to 
decide". Thus the terms "non-commitment" or "neutrality" 
must be qualified when used to substitute for nonalignment.
President Nyerere intended to bring out the implica­
tions of nonalignment when he said that, "we care very much 
about the future of humanity; but we do not believe that 
the present divisions of the world are between the good and 
the bad...We believe that the propaganda which is directed 
at making humanity believe this proposition is a most hid-
2
John Howell, "An Analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy",
The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.6, 
No. 1, 1968, p. 35.
3
Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, New York, Hill and Wang,
1967, p. 286.
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eous opium".^ An interpretation of this strong sense of 
morality and idealism is that Tanzania reserves the right 
to judge international issues on their own merits and 
that the country is as committed to objective action for 
universal peace as the Great Powers.
But in spite of these goals and interpretations it 
is still difficult to know the true intentions of these 
nonaligned states. It is probably true that motivation 
of economic development, anticolonialism and psychological 
reactions against former European political control and 
exploitation have induced the East African leaders to choose 
nonalignment in the conduct of their relations with both 
East and West. Clearly, this policy does not imply indif­
ference or non-commitment on contemporary international 
issues beside the Cold War, but encompasses the strategy 
being used to manipulate both East and West to obtain 
modernization priorities without necessarily losing sover­
eignty and political independence to any of the blocs.
When President John Kennedy was a Senator, he admitted that:
The desire to be independent and free carries with it 
the desire not to become engaged as a satellite of the Soviet 
Union or too closely allied to the United States. We have 
to live with that, and if neutrality is the result of a 
concentration on internal problems, raising the standard 
of living of the people and so on, particularly in the 
underdeveloped countries, I would accept that. It's part 
of our own history for over a hundred years.5
Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 1$4.
Burton, W.J., Nonalignment. New York, James Heineman Inc., 
1966, p. 15.
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This seems to be a fair portrayal of the attitudes of the 
East African leaders. Faced with the desperate struggle to 
build a nation from very slender resources, nonalignment is 
not only an attractive policy, but discretion in taking and 
shifting friends is regarded as a worthy strategy. When on 
October 19, 1965, the Central Executive Committee of the 
Uganda People's Congress meeting in Kampala approved reso­
lutions reaffirming the party's adherence to a foreign po­
licy of nonalignment and instructed members to "refrain 
from using abusive language against any country with which 
Uganda has diplomatic relations"^ the leaders were trying 
to consolidate their strategy for attracting foreign aid 
from the East and the West. Similarly, Jomo Kenyatta's 
speech that, "the foundation of Kenya's foreign policy is
7
the principle of nonalignment", is no less an invitation 
to foreign powers, irrespective of ideology, to help Kenya. 
This may appear to be an oversimplification of the intents 
and purposes of nonalignment policy. But considering the 
needs of the East African states and in view of their gen­
eral economic deprivations, nonalignment seems to have been 
a diplomatic weapon for achieving benefits to meet domestic 
problems.
6
News in Brief, Africa Report, Vol. 10, No.11, Bee. 1965,
p. 31.
7
Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee!, p. 57.
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But in spite of the narrow national interests which 
nonalignment seems to be satisfying, the East African states 
have stuck to the criteria of the Belgrade Conference of 
1961 which recommended that a non-aligned state:
1. should follow an independent policy based on non-
alignment (I) and peaceful co-existence;
2. should support liberation movements;
3 . should not be a member of a multilateral military
pact in the context of the East-West struggle;
4. should not be a member of a bilateral military
pact with a Big Power in the East-West struggle;
5* should not have granted military bases to foreign
powers."
Because of nationalism, claims of uniqueness and need for 
rapid economic development. East African countries are like­
ly to remain non-aligned for a long time, although, some 
will be more nonaligned than others. The extent to which 
nonalignment has been put into practice by each state shall 
be examined in the next section.
RELATIONS WITH EAST AND WEST (including the Commonwealth)
Whatever people may think about the possibility of 
detente between East and West, recent international politics 
have been largely influenced by ideological orientations 
which have divided the world into camps. The emerging coun­
tries have found themselves at the crossroad of this harsh 
expressed reluctance to be conscripted into either of the 
two main ideological camps. According to President Nyerere:
8
David K. Marvin, Emerging Africa in World Affairs, Cali­
fornia, Chandler Publishing Company, 1965, p. 215.
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Before independence we had no direct contact with East­
ern Bloc countries. After independence, we began to esta­
blish such contacts and we shall continue to strengthen them 
....It should be clear that we shall not allow anyone - whe­
ther they be from East or West, or from places not linked 
to these Blocks - to try and use our friendship for their 
own purposes. 9
But, have the East African countries practised the nonalign­
ment policy which they espoused? Have the East and West 
been given equal treatment in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda?
Kenya's foreign policy is, no doubt, characterized by 
a nonalignment orientation in favour of the West. While 
Jomo Kenyatta and the KANU Party have continued to make 
right noises about the righteousness of a nonaligned policy 
and the desirability for a just international community of 
nations, Kenya's sympathy has usually been disposed towards 
the Western bloc. The domestic political system, demands 
for foreign aid and the capitalist structure of the economy 
have bolstered the pro-Western attitude since independence. 
Conversely, there is a trend to distinctly hostile attitudes 
towards the Communist states, especially to China, after 
Oginga Odinga left the KANU government party in 1966 to form 
the socialist Opposition KADU party. Before the split, Jomo 
Kenyatta addressed the KANU members that;
What we want is Kenya Nationalism which helped us to 
win the struggle against imperialism. We do not want some­
body else's nationalism. It is a sad mistake to think that 
you can get more food, more hospitals or schools by crying 
"Communism". 10
9
Julius K. Nyerere, Tanzania on Foreign Affairs, p. 4.
10
News in Brief, Africa Report, Vol.10, No,7, July 1966, p.25.
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In 1965 Njoroge Mungai, Minister of Internal Security and 
Defense declared Wang Te Ming, Nairobi correspondent of the 
Communist Chinese Hsinhua News Agency, a prohibited immig­
rant and declared that Kenyans would no longer be allowed to 
receive military training in Communist China. In February 
1 9 6 6, the government announced that it had canceled the
agreement with the Soviet Union to construct the Kano ir-
»
rigation project and postponed all other projects that were
to be financed by Soviet loans,
Kenya, which rejects aid from most Communist states 
has rejected all forms of Chinese aid, including China's 
offer of a #30 million loan and grant in 1964. On the 
other hand, Tanzania has become a primary recipient of 
Chinese foreign aid and of assistance from all other for­
eign sources. 11
Ostensibly, Kenya's pro-Western nonalignment policy is a 
result of economic pressures. Jomo Kenyatta does not intend 
to alienate the Western aid-giving countries. Nor, for that 
matter, does he like to create an atmosphere that is unfav­
ourable to prospective entrepreneurs; so Kenya pursues a 
policy that radically undermines Communist influence. Here, 
it would seem that practice conflicts with theory. Jomo 
Kenyatta had earlier propounded that "the aim of my Govern-
12
ment which starts today is not to be pro-Left or pro-Right"^ 
that a nonalignment policy would enable Kenya to secure
11
1c>
George I. Yu, "Dragon in the Hush: Peking's Presence in
Africa", Asian Survey, Vol.VIII, No,12, Dec. 19 6 6 ,
p. 1 0 2 2.
Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee! p. 1 8.
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assistance from the two blocs and that:
Ifhen we choose some techniques from the East, it is 
not because we approve the conduct of their domestic or 
foreign policies; nor should we be accused of being pro- 
West if we adopt or perpetuate some Western ideas. We are 
determined to develop Kenya as a democratic African Social­
ist country. 13
In reality, Kenya has restricted communications with the 
Communist countries, rejected their aid and shifted more
9»
and more to the West. For example, "at independence there 
were just 20 American businesses in the country. Then pros­
pects turned rosier - and today there are 73 United States
14
firms established in Kenya". A U.S. Embassy survey rep­
orted in International Commerce (Washington, D.C.) on October 
2, 1967 noted that "Kenya's political stability and expand­
ing economy are attracting the growing interest of U.S.
15
exporters and investors". The report also noted that U.S.
exports to Kenya rose from #13.5 million in 1963 to #31.6
million in 1966 while U.S. imports from Kenya increased from
#7 . 3  million in 1965 to $l4.8 million in 1966. In 1964,
about 84 percent of total Kenyan trade were with the West
and only 2 percent with the Communist bloc. In 1966,
Oginga Odinga protested that:
I cannot tolerate an African regime dominated by either 
West or the East. If nonalignment is used to justify rela­
tions with one of these worlds alone, it is not nonalignment. 
Kenya is still, today, largely part of the Western sphere 




Ibid, p . 78 .
"American Investment Surge", Reporter: East Africa's
News Magazine. Nairobi, June IB, 1 9 6 8, p.17.
News in Brief, Africa Report. Vol.13, N0 .I, Jan.1968, p.23
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we must break the predominantly Western influence and 
develop relations with the East.l6
Regardless of domestic opposition pressures for improved 
relations with the East, the Kenya Government is showing 
greater concern for the outward forms of nonalignment 
policy:and less to its substance. Formal diplomatic re­
lations and some commercial activities exist between Kenya 
and the Communist countries but they are not strong enough 
to withstand stresses. On February 1^, 1968, a government 
statement announced the deportation of two Russians of the 
Novosti Press Agency and Sovex portfilm. Vice President 
Daniel arap Moi said that the offices of both Soviet Agen­
cies would be closed and warned that "methods used by host­
ile intelligence services to subvert and undermine govern­
ments and to carry their ideological battles into countries
which have repeatedly expressed their intention of remain-
1 7ing nonaligned " ' would not be tolerated. However, it is 
noteworthy that, "China has increased its trade with Kenya 
notwithstanding a steady deterioration in political rela­
tions. In 1966 direct exports from China to Kenya reached 
million, as compared to $23,000 in I96I; during the 
same years direct imports from Kenya came to $2.6 million 
and $1 5 0 ,0 0 0 respectively".
16
Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru. p. 2 8 5.
17
News in Brief, Africa Report. Vol. 12, No. April
1 9 6 8, p. 2 3 .
18
George, T. Yu, Asian Survey. December 1968, p. 1021.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
94
•On the other hand, Kenya's support for the Commonwealth 
has probably encouraged close relationship with Britain. 
Apart from the economic and military assistance from Bri­
tain, Jomo Kenyatta sees in the Commonwealth, a philosophy 
of racial harmony that could be applied to the Kenyan multi­
racial society. In his report of the 1964 Commonwealth 
meeting to the National Assembly, he remarked:
As regards the call for interracial harmony in the 
world, there was a definite commitment for each Commonwealth 
country to build a society providing for equal opportunities 
and non-discrimination for all its people. In this respect, 
I did not hesitate to quote the example of Kenya. 19
In terms of aid and trade Kenya relies on the Commonwealth
countries especially Britain. Until independence Britain
normally provided nearly all the assistance but since 1963,
Western countries outside the Commonwealth, have extended
aid to Kenya. In 1964, Britain spent 15 million pounds in
aid to Kenya.
Some long-term funds for industry, mining and housing 
as well as agriculture have been supplied by the Commonweal­
th Development Corporation....The total of the Corporation's 
other investments rose from 7.1 million pounds at the end 
of ,1958 to over 8.25 million pounds at the end of 1965. 20
The advantages and benefits accruing from membership to the
Commonwealth have been reflected in Kenya's attitude for the
survival of the Association, "This became particularly
19
20
Jomo Kenyatta, Karambee!, p. 52.
Commonwealth Secretariat, Commonwealth Development and 
Its Financing, London, Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 19677 p. 2 3 .
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clear at the London Commonwealth Conference of July 1966,
when the Kenyan delegation was instrumental in creating a
measure of agreement between Britain and the ad hoc,African
P 1caucus on Rhodesia, which at one stage appeared unlikely". 
Since the civil war in Nigeria, the coup d'etat in Ghana, 
the instability in Uganda and the.temporary, Tanzanian 
withdrawal of diplomatic relations with Britain over Rhodesia, 
Kenya has assumed a mediatory role on certain matters between 
African members and the rest of the Commonwealth. Corres­
pondingly, Kenya's stock and prestige have increased in 
British Government circles. And because Kenya has not 
backed out on sensitive African problems such as decoloni­
zation, she also enjoys the confidence and respect of fel­
low African members of the Association.
However, it would be misleading to give the impression 
that Kenya is complacent about her relations with Britain 
and the West. Kenyatta had been disenchanted with the 
Western acquiescence in the apartheid policy of South Africa. 
In a speech in June 1964, he expressed shock over the continu­
ation and improvement of Western trade and investments in 
South Africa. "By refusing to participate in workable sanc­
tions against South Africa, the countries of the West are 
creating a situation in which violence becomes the only
21
John Howell, "An Analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy", 
Modern African Studies, p. 48.
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pp
answer". Jomo Kenyatta also regards the lack of Western 
support for the nationalist cause in Rhodesia, Mozambique 
and Angola primarily as a Western intention to compromise 
Africans' rights to self-determination.
On Vietnam, Kenya has been dismayed over the U.S. 
involvement in an "unjust" war. Addressing the United 
Nations General Assembly in October 1968, Arwings-Kodhek,
Kenyan Minister of state in the Office of the President 
said that:
The policy of the Government of Kenya is clear on 
the issue of Vietnam. We condemn unreservedly the arro­
gance of a Big Power that sees fit to tread on the toes 
of a small nation without provocation. We feel, more­
over, that this is a futile war in which the mighty obvi­
ously cannot hope to win...We believe that peace can come 
to that unfortunate land any time the United States
wishes.28
Clearly, Kenya's stand is consistent with her frequent 
reassertion of the need for world peace and a just inter­
national community of nations. Therefore, condemnation 
of U.S.. on Vietnam is not necessarily an anti-Western 
policy. The Fact that U.S. attitude towards Kenya has 
not changed since then is a reinforcement of this argument.
Tanzania's practice of nonalignment shows how difficult 
it is for a small African country to actively seek the 
application in Southern Africa of the principle of the 
rights of peoples everywhere to self-determination and at 
the same time to remain on friendly terms with Western countries.
22
Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee!, p. 49.
23
Arwings-Kodhek, M.P. - Kenya Speech to the 23rd Session, 
U.N. General Assembly. October 15, 1968, p. 10.
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tike most countries emerging from colonial status, Tanzania 
.was heavily dependent upon the western world at the time of 
independence. Over 80 percent of her total trade was with 
the sterling area while most of the top posts in the Civil 
Service were held by personnels from the West. But in 
1964 the situation changed dramatically. The change was 
brought about by a rapid succession of events - "the revolu­
tion in neighbouring Zanzibar, the mutinies of the three 
East African armies which necessitated an appeal to British 
troops, the union of Tanganyika with Zanzibar under the 
name of Tanzania, the Chinese offer of military advisers 
and a loan, the rebellion in the neighbouring Congo which 
caused refugees to pour over the borders, and the declar­
ation of war on Portugal by Mozambique freedom fighters
plx
based in Tanganyika". This list of events and Tanzania's 
reactions urged a re-evaluation of the country's foreign 
policy.
To begin with, the union with Zanzibar gave rise to 
certain diplomatic problems. Zanzibar had been maintaining 
diplomatic relations with East Germany before union. This 
was a violation of the Hallstein doctrine on which West 
Germany broke relations with Zanzibar. On the other hand, 
Tanganyika recognized West Germany before union, an action
24
Catherine Hoskyns, "Africa's Foreign Relations", Inter­
national Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 3, July 1968, 
p. 4 5 2 .
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that conformed with the spirit of the Hallstein doctrine.
In an attempt to tackle the problem squarely, accomodate 
each other and compromise the foreign threats to unification, 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar decided to extend diplomatic rela­
tions to both East and West Germany. This was unacceptable 
to West Germany and the latter stopped military aid to 
Tanzania. President Nyerere reacted by rejecting develop­
ment aid from Bonn as well.
Also before 1964, Tanzania and other African states 
relied on gentle and discreet diplomacy to secure the trans­
ference of power from the colonial governments. By 1964 
it became clear that diplomacy would be of no avail in 
liberating Southern Africa, Mozambique and Angola. Most 
African governments had to decide to what lengths they 
would go in opposing the policies of these Western countries 
which they regarded as impeding liberation. Tanzania adopted 
the most militant position of the three East African herself 
as the enemy of Britain, France, West Germany or the United 
States. But it does mean that her passionate concern for 
liberation brings her into frequent and inevitable conflict 
with these countries. Besides, the presence of the Mozam­
bique liberation group FRELIMO in Tanzania has undoubtedly 
reinforced Tanzania's anti-Portuguese policies at the same 
time that it has raised the fear of Portuguese retaliatory 
bombing of Dar-es-Salaam if FRELIMO becomes too active in 
Mozambique. The exiles' presence has stimulated a heavy 
inflow of arms into Tanzania from the Eastern bloc and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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probably necessitated the build-up of the Tanzanian army 
as a potential counter weight to the nationalist fighters 
in case things get out of hand. Thus, domestic conside­
rations and Tanzania's commitment to continental African 
freedom meant closer ties should be maintained with the 
East in order to receive supplies of military hardware to 
aid nationalist forces.
But in his opening of the window to the East, Nyerere 
expressed the desire to steer clear of the East-West con­
flict. On his first state visit to the People's Republic 
of China in February 1965, he used an East African proverb 
to express Tanzania's policy that:
When elephants fight, it is the grass which gets 
crushed...where there are hostile blocs facing each other 
on the world stage Tanzania will ignore the threats or 
blandishments from both sides and pursue her own interests. 
..It is tnis belief which underlies our opposition to colo­
nialism and neocolonialism. We wish to be friendly with 
all, and we will never allow our friends to choose our 
enemies for u s . 25
However, events following the state visit to China have 
further vindicated Nyerere's lukewarm attitude to the West. 
Firstly, Nyerere saw in China, the image and prototype of 
Tanzania's economic structure and was highly impressed by 
the Chinese self-reliance policy which was yielding rapid 
economic development. It should be remembered that follow-;
Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, pp. 323-324.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
ing the 1949 Communist Revolution in China, Western aid was 
withdrawn but Mao-Tse-tung organized the economy, regulated 
the living standards of the people and expanded agricultur­
al production. The 19&7 Tanzanian self-reliance Declarat­
ion at Arusha was probably a tribute to this model.
Secondly, Chinese extension of credits and loans to 
Tanzania had been generous. '•"By June 1968, China had of­
fered the country a total of $36.3 million in loans. All 
aid has been allocated to development expenditures with 
projects ranging from a completely equipped textile mill, 
the development of a state farm, and assistance in the con­
struction of a police academy to the offer to survey and
26
construct the Tan-Zam railroad". The construction of the 
railroad would cost China over #300 million. This is the 
boldest single project yet to be undertaken by China in 
Africa. When the project was first proposed, Western fin­
ance was refused because organizations that studied its 
feasibility reported that costs would be greater than the 
economic advantage. Tanzania placed high value on the pro­
ject and proposed to receive aid wherever possible.
The ready involvement of China in Tanzania's develop­
ment considerably undermined Western influence as Tanzania's 
policy gradually became hardened against the West. In 
December 1965, Tanzania rejected a #21 million loan from
26
George T. Yu, Asian Survey, Dec. 1968, p. 1021.
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and broke off diplomatic relations with Britain over Rho­
desia. But in announcing this action, Nyerere explained 
that:
I should perhaps, add that breaking diplomatic relat­
ions with the British Government does not at present mean 
that Tanzania will be leaving the Commonwealth, The Com­
monwealth is a multi-national organization, and although it 
is still true that Britain, for historical reasons, has a 
very special place in the Commonwealth, it is no longer the 
British Commonwealth - it is a Commonwealth of free nations. 
....But loyalty to the Commonwealth, and support for its 
principles is impossible without loyalty to the Organization 
of African Unity. 2?
Nyerere's current view about the Commonwealth is more mode­
rate than what he expressed in the Royal Commonwealth Jour­
nal of December 1961, that if membership of the Commonwealth 
was not in the "best interests of Tanganyika's efforts to ad­
vance the unity and welfare of people in the continent,
28
Tanganyika would give up her Commonwealth membership".
It should be remarked that Nyerere really threatened to 
leave the Commonwealth over South African membership in 1961, 
South Africa had to withdraw her membership from the Asso­
ciation over the allegation that her apartheid policy was 
making a mockery of the multi-racial character of the Com­
monwealth.
Another issue that seemed to have driven Tanzania away 
from the Nest is the Vietnam war. In his address to the
27
Mwalimu Julius E. Nyerere, The Honour of Africa, Dar-
es-Salaam, National Printing Co. Ltd. Dec. 1965, 
pp. 11-14.
28
Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 136.
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TANU Conference on October l6, 1967, President Nyerere as­
sailed U.S. presence in Vietnam and said that;
Ne are told that great principles are involved, and 
that the richest nation on earth is defending those prin­
ciples against attack....But if this is a civil war, what 
are outside nations doing in that conflict?.... The U.S.A. 
must recover from the delirium of power, and return to the 
principles upon which her nation was founded. 29
Of course, strained relations with the U.S. were not enti­
rely based on Tanzania's opposition to American involvement 
in Vietnam. The essential issue seemed to have developed 
from the alleged Western plot of November 1964 according to 
which Foreign Minister Kambona claimed that a n ’American 
Congo-based conspiracy was planning to overthrow the Tan­
zanian Government. In a rally at Dar-es-Salaam on November 
15, 1964, President Nyerere said;
Ne get this news. The U.S. Government is tired of see­
ing Dar-es-Salaam being used by the Chinese to the detriment 
of the Western countries and for the purpose of breaking 
the peace of Africa. And that their Government has decided 
to put an end to this....My brothers, we are not gods. Ne 
are human beings. Ne have been threatened too much in the 
past. Wliat should we have done?....It was only the other 
day that Portugal threatened us; and then today we get the 
news....30
In concluding the speech, Nyerere declared that the American 
Ambassador had denied reports of the conspiracy but, not­
withstanding, he would hand over the documents to the Amba­
ssador for examination. After this incident, distrust and
29
Julius K. Nyerere, Tanzania Policy on Foreign Affairs, 
pp. 5-6.
30
Nilliam Tordoff, Government and Politics in Tanzania, 
Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 19 6 7 ,
p. 1 7 6.
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suspicions developed within the Government against America.
In 1965 another quarrel flared up in Dar-es-Salaam 
which culminated in the expulsion of two Senior American 
diplomats from Tanzania for subversive activities. The 
United States struck back by expelling one of the officials 
in the Tanzanian Embassy at Washington. Each country re­
called its Ambassador for consultations but results did 
not show any appreciable diplomatic understanding between 
the two countries. Of recent, the U.S. announced the wind- 
Ing-up of its Peace Corps program in Tanzania. Tanzania 
was one of the first nations in the world picked by the U.S. 
for the Peace Corps program. From the former strength of 
over 400, the Peace Corps delegation is now eleven in Tan­
zania. The program is scheduled to be scrapped entirely by 
the end of 19&9. A Peace Corps official said recently that, 
"In a sense, it's a marriage that has had a very rocky go 
of it. We know what their (Tanzania's) feelings are. And 
they know we'll leave quietly".81 Some of the past depar­
tures stemmed from charges of espionage activities against 
the Peace Corps workers.
No doubt, the foregoing discussion would leave one with 
the impression that Tanzania's nonalignment has not been 
favourable to the West, yet Nyerere has not deliberately 
pursued an anti-West policy. For example, in spite of the 
low-level diplomatic relations with Britain, U.S. and West
The Christian Science Monitor. Boston, Thursday, February 
2 7, 1969, p. 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
• 104
Germany, Nyerere has encouraged the presence of Canadian 
teachers and C.U.S.O. volunteers. In 196? Canada complet­
ed a supply of #15 million worth of military aid to Tanza­
nia. The aid consisted of Caribous and the air-transport 
wing of the defense forces. Negotiations had also been con­
cluded to increase the Canadian assistance for the building
32
of a military academy in the"northern town of Arusha. In
recent years attempts have been made to develop close rela­
tions with Japan. At the completion of a visit to Tokyo in
November 1967, Economic Development Minister Bomani signed 
a credit agreement worth of 967,000 pounds with the Export- 
Import Bank of Japan for the finance of a cashew nut pro­
cessing plant at Mtwara in Southern Tanzania.
In September 1968, President Nyerere announced the res­
toration of diplomatic relations with Britain after a suc­
cessful Canadian mediation. This is a significant develop­
ment with quite uncertain implications. Vfhile Britain has 
not changed her stand on the use of force to bring down the 
Rhodesian Smith Government, Tanzania joined her Commonwealth 
colleagues in the January 1969 Conference in London. Rep­
orters even claimed that Nyerere was surprisingly moderate 
on the Rhodesian issue and that he played considerable in­
fluence on the attitude of other African members to the
3
See the Canadian 1967 Annual Reuort for the Department 
of External Affairs, Queen's Printer and Controller 
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British Government. However, Nyerere gave an indication 
of flexibility when he said on October 16, 1967 that:
Most other African states took a different view of 
the O.A.U. Resolution than we did, and of those that acted 
with us, some have now reconsidered their position. In 
these circumstances it will be for the Tanzanian Government 
in the coming months to consider what action will best 
serve our continuing purposes.33
Lastly, Tanzania's international relations present some ele­
ments of curiosity. It would seem that her desire to stick 
to the principle of self-determination in Africa, her pre­
ference for friendship with the Great Powers and the reject­
ion of reliability on any have, often times, led her into 
conflicts with the West. However, one wonders why the 
Soviet involvement has been so minimal as to be almost 
negligible. Surely the East Germans give some aid and tech­
nical assistance to Tanzania, especially Zanzibar. But there 
seems to be little doubt that China's considerable presence 
has reduced Soviet involvement. Indeed, President Nyerere 
should be trusted on his views that, "any real discussion 
of the nonalignment of Tanzania's foreign policy should 
therefore be based on an examination of what we do, more 
than on what is said publicly".34
If Kenya's "moderate" nonalignment is pro-West, and 
Tanzania is acclaimed as an African pacesetter for radical
33 J.K. Nyerere, Tanzania on Foreign Affairs, p. 12.
34 Irene Brown, "Studies on Nonalignment", The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 4, Nol 47 December
1966, p. 5 2 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
106
foreign policy, Uganda's relations with East and Nest are, 
perhaps, the best example of a truly nonaligned policy. In
her relations with the Great Powers, Uganda has tried to
maintain a scrupulous neutralism. Consequently, President 
Obote accepts financial and technical aid from Britain and 
the United States and military aid from the Soviet Union, 
China and Czechoslovakia. »
To a large extent, aid is essentially a part of an in­
dividual country's relations with Uganda. While historic 
associations and the capitalist structure of the economy 
have brought Ugandan trade relations closer to the Nest, 
President Obote has deliberately tried to court Communist 
aid in order to offset any alleged alignment with the Nest. 
The encouragement of the East and Nest missions to the Ug­
andan borders and Obote's occasional visits to the Eastern 
countries demonstrate that the Ugandan Government views 
foreign aid in political terms. In his state visit to the 
People's Republic of China in 1965, President Obote nego­
tiated an interest-free loan of #13.4 million from China and
35
invited Chou en Lai to visit Uganda. In his attempt to 
negotiate and receive aid from East and Nest, Obote has em­
phasized his desire to remain on friendly terms with the 
two camps. In his opening address to the Council on World 
Tensions Conference held in May 1965 at Makerere, he explain­
ed :
35
News in Brief, Africa Report. Vol.10, No.9, October 6 5 , 
p. 59.
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Suppose we in Uganda wanted to experiment with growing 
swamp rice on the shores of one of our lakes. It might turn 
out that the best combination for the project would be Amer­
ican and some Chinese advisers. It is questionable whether 
we would be likely to get assistance for a project put to­
gether on this basis. If we could do so it might be of 
value not only to us but also to other nations concerned.36
Certainly a combined aid operation between U.S.A. and China 
seems remote at the moment but President Obote is ready to 
accept assistance from China»in the. same spirit as aid is 
received from other foreign sources, without discrimination- 
or prejudice. So far, aid from the Communist countries is 
not as extensive as that from the Nest. The Soviet Union 
has offered 5.5 million pounds in long-term credits to build 
a textile factory, a training centre specializing in mech­
anical agriculture, meat refrigerating installations and a 
dairy factory. Arrangements have also been concluded with 
the Soviet Union for the supply of bulldozers and tractors 
for road construction.
Obote's attitude to the Commonwealth has also allowed 
Uganda to receive technical and development aid from the 
Association. Since independence, Britain has remained the 
largest source of external financial assistance to the 
Ugandan Development Plan.
To maintain the momentum of development expenditure 
after the aid already agreed before independence was ex­
hausted (which was by mid-1963), the U.K. Government made 
a grant to Uganda of 1.5 million pounds and a Commonwealth 
Assistance Loan of 2.4 million pounds. This brought the
Ralph Clark, Aid in Uganda - Programmes and Policies.
England, The Overseas Development Insti­
tute Ltd., 1 9 6 6, p. 46.
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total of British financial aid from July 196I to 8.6 million 
pounds....There was further a grant of 50,000 pounds for im­
provements to the Uganda Rifles barracks at Jinja and the 
United Kingdom continued to meet part of the cost of milita­
ry forces - up to 200,000 pounds - until 31st of March,
1 9 6 3. 37
In recent times the Commonwealth Assistance loan has been 
used to finance Group Farming Scheme and a television sta­
tion. The Group Farming Scheme was started in 1963 along 
with the introduction of mechanized agriculture for which 
the British loan was requested. Thus, British assistance 
has been of extreme importance to Uganda. In fact, without 
it, the Ugandan economy would collapse. On the other hand, 
U.S. financial aid has been operating on specific projects 
handled by the Peace Corps and the Agency for International 
Development. In terms of outright grants and financial aid, 
American assistance has been small until recently. In the 
first three years of the Five-Year Plan, U.S. aid amounted 
to 2.2 million pounds in loans and grants but in 1966 the 
loan had gone up to 6 million pounds.
However, it is the military supply to Uganda that has 
generated some confusion. For some years after independen­
ce, Uganda relied on Israel for the training of the army, 
the air force and the supply of Fouga-Magister that could 
carry rockets. More recently. President Obote has turned 
to the Communist world for military air-support. In August 
1 9 6 8, Foreign Minister Odaka explained that:
37
Ibid, p. 4 9 .
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Ne have also, in the course of building up our army, 
purchased certain arms and ammunition from the Soviet Union 
and from Czechoslovakia. Again, I want to assure you that 
neither the arms nor the ammunition could be said to have, 
in themselves, any communistic inclinations. Nor can the 
arms we purchase from Belgium, Australia, Britain or from 
Israel, be labelled capitalistic. The fact that you buy 
these arms from such sources can easily make you unpopular 
in certain quarters. 38
Obote's use of this diverse arrangement of military supply 
and training is intended to*bolster Uganda's nonalignment 
policy.
With Kenya showing renewed suspicion of all the Commu­
nist powers and Tanzania becoming increasingly hospitable 
to the Chinese, Uganda might seem to offer the Russians 
their best opportunity to extend their influence into East 
and Central Africa. But there is no panic among Western 
observers in Kampala. None doubts that President Obote is 
sincere in his nonalignment, and shrewd enough to handle all 
comers. 39
Thus, President Obote seems to have been more realistic and 
less partisan in his application of a nonaligned policy than 
his immediate neighbours in East Africa.
POLICIES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
The admissions of the East African states to the United 
Nations have roughly coincided with the phenomenal influx of 
new members to the Organization since I960. Generally, but 
in differing ways, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have expressed 
faith and unflinching support for the ideals of the United
38
S. N. Odaka, Speech on Our Institutions and Foreign 
Aspects, Entebbe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
August 3, 1 9 6 8, p. 6.
39
Charles Taylor, "Obote's Plan to be Master of his Bord­
ers", Globe and Mail, Toronto, May l4, 1968, p.?.
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Nations, But Tanzania's support for the Organization is, 
probably, a result of Tanganyika's colonial association with 
the Trusteeship Council. In his maiden speech to the United 
Nations General Assembly on December 14, 1961, President 
Nyerere expressed the view that:
Ne feel a special gratitude and loyalty to the United 
Nations because we are conscious of the debt we owe to the 
Trusteeship Council and, of course, to this General Assembly
 Our pleasure at being accepted as a Member of the United
Nations is a recognition that we have been given the right 
to join in the search for greater harmony between the peo­
ples of the world. 4o
By approving the termination of the trusteeship agreements 
in Tanganyika, the U.N. formally sanctioned national inde­
pendence and the full participation of mainland Tanzania in 
the deliberations of the World Organization. Even with Kenya 
and Uganda, where the U.N. did not directly influence the 
liquidation of colonialism, it has performed a validating 
function. For the two countries, membership has endowed them 
with a degree of legitimacy and enhances their status as 
separate entities. Also, on account of their militancy 
against colonialism, the U.N. forum is commonly regarded as 
the appropriate place for the furtherance of pan-Africanist 
ideals of decolonization.
In Kenya, anticolonialist sentiments figure very pro­
minently on the foreign policy. Often times, the Government 
has carried this passion to the U.N. Consequently, Kenya 
regards the U.N., "not so much as an Organization primarily
■5Ô
J, K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, pp. 144-145.
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designed to ensure peace and security- as the big powers
intended it to be - but as an organization which should be
1+1
primarily concerned with human rights at large". In his
speech to the General Assembly in 1964, Foreign Minister
Murumbi said that:
There are still millions of our African brothers in 
South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, French Somali­
land and the Spanish colonies who are living under the 
worst forms of human oppression. They are denied the right 
to self-determination; the regimes imposed upon them by 
brute force have stamped out their fundamental rights and 
freedoms, contrary to the United Nations Charter, the Uni­
versal Declaration of Human Rights and the various other 
international instruments intended to promote human rights 
throughout the world.42
Of course, all the African countries use the U.N. forum to 
condemn colonialism but Kenya certainly thinks that the 
Organization should also promote international morality 
especially that relates to the rights of the oppressed 
peoples and weak nations. In his own evaluation of the 
role of the United Nations in respect to the liquidation 
of colonialism, President Nyerere thinks that the Organi­
zation should assume more responsibility in this task. He 
said:
We do not see how it is possible for any single nation 
to be judge of its own cause, as some colonial powers decide 
to be judges of their own causes. We would therefore like 
to see, the united Nations assume the responsibility of being
judge.^8
41
Ali A. Mazrui, The United Nations and Some African
Political Attitudes, International Organization. 
Vol. XVIIl, No. 3i Summer 1964, p. 503.
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The above views of President Nyerere are not very specific 
on what the U.N. should do in respect of decolonization, 
but, one can assume that he wants more effective sanctions 
against countries impeding total liquidation of colonialism 
in Africa.
Closely related to the East African calls for decolo-
»
nization and the persistent advocation for peace with
justice all over the world is also the agitation for the
admission of Communist China into the World Organization
In 1 9 6 3 , Uganda and Tanganyika voted with thirty-nine other
members in a bid to seat the Chinese People's Republic in
the General Assembly. In 1964, Kenya gained membership to
the U.N. and voted in 1965 for another resolution urging
the admission of China to the U.N. From the time of their
membership to the Organization, all the East African states
have consistently voted for the Admission of China to the 
44U.N. In their speeches, the East Africans argue that 
the exclusion of the Chinese People's Republic is a mis­
carriage of justice by the international community of 
nations and that continued isolation of a nuclear power and 
the most populous state in the world is an unrealistic 
policy for an organization which regards itself as a repo­
sitory of power in the preservation of world peace. The 
East African attitude can, perhaps, best be illustrated by 
the Ugandan Foreign Minister Odaka's speech to the General 
Assembly in 1964.
44-------
See Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "China, the United States s.nd 
the United Nations", International Organization. Vol. XX, 
No. 4. Autumn 1966, pp. 672-676 for the East African voting 
behavior on the admission of the Chinese Peoples Republic 
to the United Nations.
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In the submission of my delegation, the question of 
whether there is one China or two Chinas should not be per­
mitted to cloud the issue. The People's Republic of China 
representing as it does the world's oldest and most popul­
ous country must be represented in this Organization. In 
considering the question of the admission of the People's 
Republic, we must not be prejudiced by ideological, econo­
mic or political considerations. We should be guided only 
by our determination to make this Organization truly univ­
ersal and an effective instrument for the preservation of 
world peace. 45
In fact, the East African states and other militantly anti­
apartheid countries in Africa would settle for the expulsion 
of South Africa from and the admission of China to the U.N. 
They think that racial discrimination and the attendant 
violation of human rights are the real potential threats to 
world peace. They sometimes go all their way to predict 
that a black and white racial confrontation in South Africa 
would result into a holocust with implications affecting 
the whole world. In this setting of rationalization, it 
would appear that the East African states - and many O.A.U. 
members, for that matter - tend to put more emphasis on the
demands "making human rights fundamental to peace rather .
46
than vice versa".
Quite apart from providing opportunities for the ex­
pression of important viewpoints affecting Africa and world 
peace, the U.N. has afforded the East African states econo-
45
Odaka-Uganda, U.N. General Assembly, 19th Session,
Official Records, A/PV. 1293, December 1964, 
pp. 72-75.
46
Ali A. Kazrui, International Organization, Summer, 
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mie and easy contact with other members of the international 
community. For example, after independence Uganda stated 
that, "it is very expensive both in manpower and finance to 
open and maintain an embassy and, therefore, as a develop­
ing country, Uganda is reluctantly forced to limit severely
47
the number of missions she establishes". Similarly, when
Ç-
Tanganyika became independent, she announced an austerity 
allocation of embassies to only three countries and the 
greatest priority was given to the U.N. Mission. In the cal­
culations and thinking of Nyerere and the Ugandan Government, 
New York is a highly useful ambassadorial listening post, 
undoubtedly, the best place in the world to pick up infor­
mation on other governments. Perhaps they are right; a 
researcher once remarked that the United Nations:
provide voluminous documentation that covers virtually 
all international problems.... This documentation is, of 
course, more important to some nations than it is to others. 
For smaller nations and nations not directly involved in 
some issues, the United Nations information sources may pro­
vide virtually all of the data on which national positions 
are based. 48
No less influential on the attitudes of the East African 
states to the World Organization are the U.N. technical and 
economic development assistance to Kenya, Tanzania and Ug­
anda. Aids are channelled through specialized agencies like
47
Government of Uganda, Uganda's Foreign Policy Since In­
dependence , Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Entebbe, 
Uganda, 1968, p. 8.
48
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the Food and Agriculture Organization, World Health Organi­
zation, International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop­
ment, the Economic Commission for Africa and supplemented 
by the Expanded Technical Assistance Program. Upon becoming 
independent, the East African countries found themselves
without adequate staffs of qualified nationals and in need
»
of substantial numbers of foreign personnel to keep the gov­
ernmental and economic machine going. Assistance was also 
needed in the training of Africans for the eventual takeover 
of the administration. The U.N. Technical Assistance has 
been of immense help to these states in filling the gaps 
left by colonial administration and also in the provision 
of funds and material aids for development. Through the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
a medium of dialogue and increased trade involvement with 
the outside world has been established.
No doubt, these material privileges have bolstered the 
support of the East African countries for the United Nations. 
Jomo Kenyatta acknowledged this when he said, on the United 
Nations’ Day in October 1964 that, "beyond its great purpose 
in political philosophy and adjustment, we in Kenya apprec-- 
iate very greatly the practical efforts and aid of the 
United Nations, through its specialized agencies in the
II
field"o Foreign Minister, Odaka puts it in another way when
49
Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee! p. 57.
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he said that, "even without material or other benefits Ug-
50
anda's faith in the United Nations is strong". Since ec­
onomic development remains a strong force in East African 
politics and to the extent that these states make the fight 
for justice, international morality and the preservation of 
human rights the conditions for world peace, Kenya, Tanza­
nia and Uganda will continue to support the United Nations 
and its ideals.
50
S. N. Odaka - Uganda, U:;N. General Assembly Records, 
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Within the three preceding chapters, attempts have been 
made to analyse the foreign policies of the three East African
states in relation to other African countries and the outside
world. Of course, the consideration of a foreign policy
is not exclusively confined to the examination of daily
patterns of interaction between states. It encompasses a 
wide range of related factors such as the consideration of 
national interests and capabilities - tangible and intangible 
- which influence the decisions of the policy-makers.
In most countries, foreign policy is largely influenced 
by national interests and domestic policies. The fact that 
the East African States are generally poor, young on the 
international scene and still at the initial stage of economic 
development have increased domestic influence on their foreign 
policy formulations. In spite of their general lack of 
capital and natural resources, they want an accelerated socio­
economic development. Consequently, the decision-makers, on 
the whole, choose to be pragmatic in their foreign policy 
orientations. They express the desire to receive aid from 
foreign powers if it would not involve a loss of independence. 
Also the demands for decolonization of the dependent African 
states and the desire not to participate in Cold War conflicts 
make Pan Africanism and nonalignment the focus of foreign
117
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policy orientations of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.
Pan-Africanism is very difficult to define but in part­
icular reference to the East African foreign policies, it 
serves two outstanding purposes. Firstly, it serves as a 
driving force for the liquidation of colonialism in Africa.
Decolonization is an objective to which all independent
»
African states are committed, although with varying degrees 
of zeal. In East Africa, it is a logical extension of the 
belief in fundamental human rights and the right of small 
. states to self-determination. Also on account of their geo­
graphical proximity to the dependent areas of Southern Africa, 
the East African states feel a special moral obligation to 
help fellow Africans whose rights to freedom have been vio­
lated. However, their ability to implement decolonization 
policy on their own is limited; therefore, they choose to 
work through the Organization of African Unity and the 
United Nations.
It would be misleading, notwithstanding, to give the 
impression that the three East African states uphold deco­
lonization with the same degree of tenacity. They each 
declare in their foreign and domestic policies that their 
independence will not be complete until colonialism is 
completely eradicated on the African continent but the 
Rhodesian issue has proved the extent to which Kenya and 
Uganda would act in the pursuit of this policy. Despite 
the O.A.U. resolution of December 3-, 1965 that member 
states should break off diplomatic relations with Britain
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if she failed to crush the Smith Government by December 15, 
only Tanzania honoured this pledge. The desire not to 
alienate the British Government which provides a substantial 
development assistance to Kenya and Uganda was probably 
responsible for their apparent inability to implement the 
O.A.U. resolution. If this interpretation is correct, Kenya 
and Uganda could be regarded as selfish and hypocritical in 
respect of their decolonization policy. On the other hand, 
Tanzania could be regarded as the only country that has 
consistently pursued her decolonization policy since inde­
pendence. The 1963 decision of the O.A.U. to base the head­
quarters of the African Liberation Committee in Dar-es-Salaam 
was probably a tribute to the support and devotion which 
Tanganyika was giving to the cause of liberation.
Secondly, Pan-Africanism constitutes an ideological 
base for the foreign policy orientation of the East African 
states to other African countries. It is used to promote 
friendliness between states and to suppress hostilities 
around the borders. Put in another way, Pan-Africanism is 
a positive effort to achieve such identification between 
African states to facilitate brotherhood solidarity and 
functional co-operation. The principle that underlay the 
inauguration of the "Good Neighbor" Summit of I966 at 
Nairobi is fundamental to this line of analysis.
Support for the O.A.U. is another significant foreign 
policy orientation of the East African states. Since its 
inceptior, the O.A.U. has been concerned with the limitation
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of outside involvement in African affairs. By approving 
the O.A.U. Charter, Article III, Section 7, which recommends 
that member states should pursue "a policy of nonalignment 
with regard to all blocs", the East African states have 
identified with the O.A.U. attempts to immunize African 
states against Cold War conflicts. However, their choice 
of nonalignment in the conduct of their relations with 
outside world should be more appropriately explained in 
terms of national interests. It is difficult to conclude 
that Tanzania which ignored an O.A.U. resolution in her 
recognition of Biafra or Kenya and Uganda which failed to 
honour their pledge on the Rhodesian issue have adopted 
nonalignment, primarily as a demonstration of their loyalties 
to the O.A.U. Charter.
The East African leaders start from the assumption 
that contemporary global international affairs are dominated 
largely by the conflicts between the Communist and the 
Western powers, more particularly by the rivalries between 
the United States, the Soviet Union and China. In their 
foreign policy formulations they have expressed the unwilling­
ness to participate in the conflicts that have no relevance 
to their domestic policies. Besides, having just emerged 
from the colonial status, they are deeply apprehensive of 
losing their sovereignties to foreign powers. Consequently, 
they choose to be friendly with all the major Powers and 
reject the possibility of an absolute reliance on any.
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Their dedication to policies of rapid economic development 
also make them declare their willingness to receive aid 
from both East and West, without prejudice or discrimi­
nation. The findings in this research show, however, that 
Kenya looks to the West for patterns of government, ideolo­
gical orientation and aid for development. Tanzania looks 
towards China for direction on economic developments based 
on self-reliance, and Uganda has consciously maintained 
her'.nonalignment by actively seeking aid from both East 
and West. Whether attitudinal behaviours have been favou­
rable to the East or West or positively neutral, it seems 
that all the East African states have been getting economic 
benefits from the pursuit of their nonaligned policy.
Lastly, the brief analysis of the East African policies 
to the United Nations reveals that the three states share 
some confidence in and support for the Organization. How­
ever, there is a tendency on the parts of the states to 
assume that the United Nations is largely influenced by 
the Western bloc. They see the inability of the United 
Nations to enforce decolonization in South-West Africa and 
Rhodesia as a result of Western acquiescence to the policies 
of the regimes in Pretoria and Salisbury. They think that 
U.N. intervention in the Congo was influenced by the Western 
countries. Although they did not specifically condemn the 
U.N. action, they blamed the Western countries and supported 
the O.A.U. Conciliation Commission under Jomo Kenyatta in 
appealing to President Johnson to end U.S. military inter­
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vention in the Congo.
The East African states also contend that the U.N. 
seems to reflect the old European system of international 
relations. Nyerere has even suggested that the Organization 
should be reconstituted so that it can effectively promote 
the dignity of man, justice and the well-being of all 
members. The two other East African leaders would probably 
agree to this proposition but it is hard to see whether 
there is any marked difference between the proposition and 
the present structure and operation of the U.N.
Similarly, on account of their stated policies on 
colonialism, and their faith in the rights of small states 
to self-determination, it would seem that the East African 
states, especially Tanzania, would reject any attempt to 
make the declared United Nations purpose of maintaining 
international peace and security the number one priority 
if it enables the Western countries to maintain a colonial 
status quo in Africa. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have been 
joining other Afro-Asian countries in demanding that Britain 
should use force in crushing the rebellion in Rhodesia.
They have also made concerted efforts with other African 
states to end South African participation in various Inter­
national Conferences because of her apartheid policy. They 
seem to have brought their own priorities to the United Nations 
and would like to interpret world politics in terms of these 
priorities. To the extent that policies are largely influ­
enced by demands for total decolonization in Africa and the 
priorities of human rights. East African attitudes to the 
United Nations will remain ambiguous.
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^APPENDIX I
' TEE FEDERATION DECLARATION OF 
5TK JD1Œ, 19'63
The following statement was issued in Nairobi on
?• -
Wednesday, June 5, 1963 by the President of the Republic 
of Tanganyika, Dr. Julius K. Nyerere; the Prime Minister 
of Uganda Dr. Milton A. Obote; and the Prime Minister of ■ 
Kenya, Mr. Jomo Kenyatta:
We, the leaders of the people and Governments of East 
Africa assembled in Nairobi on June 5, 1963, pledge oursel­
ves to the political Federation of East Africa.
Our meeting today is motivated by the spirit of Pan- 
Africanism and not by mere selfish Regional interests. We 
are nationalists and reject tribalism, racialism or inward 
looking policies. We believe that the day of decision has 
come and to all our people we say there is no more room 
for'slogans and words. This is our day of action in the 
cause of the ideals that we believe in and unity and free­
dom for which we have suffered and sacrificed so much.
Within this spirit of Pan-Africanism and following 
the declaration of African unity at the recent Addis Ababa 
conference practical steps should be taken wherever possible
123
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to accelerate the achievement of our common goal.
We believe that the East African Federation can be a 
practical step towards the goal-of Pan-African unity. We 
hope that our action will help to accelerate the efforts
A
already being made by our brothers throughout the Continent 
to achieve Pan-African unity.
We share a common past and are convinced of our com­
mon destinies. We have a common history, culture and 
customs which make our unity both logical and natural.
Our futures are inevitably bound together by the identical 
aspirations and hopes of our peoples and the need for si­
milar efforts in facing the tasks that lie ahead of each 
of our free nations.
In the past century the hand of Imperialism grasped 
the whole Continent and in this part of Africa our people 
found themselves included together in what the Colonialists 
styled "The British sphere of influence”. Now that we are 
once again free or are on the point of regaining our free­
dom we believe the time has come to consolidate our unity 
and provide it with a constitutional basis.
For some years we have worked together in the PAFMECA 
where we have accepted common objectives and ideas and 
created the essential spirit of unity between ourselves
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and among our people. We are happy that with KANU’s vic­
tory in the Kenya elections we now have in the three East 
African countries Governments which are fully committed to 
genuine African nationalism and Pan-African unity.
For 4o years the Imperialists and local settler mino­
rities tried to impose political federation upon us. Our 
people rightly resisted these attempts. Federation at 
that time would quickly have led to one thing - a vast 
White dominated dominion.
The East Africa High Commission and its successor 
the Common Services Organization have taught us the value 
of links in the economic field. Indeed it was the recog­
nition of the value of these connections which led the 
two fully Independent members to agree to continue parti­
cipation after they had achieved their freedom. In many 
practical ways we already are co-operating - in scientific 
research; in communications and in postal services. An 
important factor in view of our determination to achieve 
Federation is the existence of shared currency; a leading 
aspect of economic working together is the functioning of 
the E.A. Common Market.
Thus the value of working together has been adequately
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demonstrated in the E.A.C.S.O. and in the Common Market 
hut the scope for further joint action remains wide. 
Economic planning, maximum utilisation of manpower and 
our other resources, the establishment of a Central Bank
A
and common defence programme and foreign and diplomatic 
representation are areas in which we need to work toge­
ther. Such approach would provide greater co-ordination 
and savings in both scarce capital, facilities for train­
ing and manpower. What is more we would have a total 
population of some 25 million people - a formidable force 
and a vast market to influence economic development at 
home, attract greater investment and enhance our prestige 
and influence abroad.
The movement towards popular Government and Indepen­
dence in our various countries of recent years has brought 
forward the issue of truly popular Governments in each 
country and removes fears of minority or settler domina­
tion under Federation.
We believe a political Federation of East Africa is 
desired by our peoples. There is throughout East Africa 
a great urge for unity and an appreciation of the signi­
ficance of Federation.
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We are aware that local and territorial factors have 
to be taken into account. We firmly believe that ways 
can be devised of overcoming any fears and of surmounting 
such difficulties. Special attention will be paid to the 
accommodation of relevant territorial interests in draw­
ing up the constitution of the East African Federation.
We believe, in fact, that some of these territorial pro­
blems can be solved in the context of such an East African 
Federation.
As already mentioned we have some basis for a Joint 
endeavour in the political as well as in the economic 
spheres. The Common Services authority was conceived as 
a body for this purpose although up to now its function­
ing was greatly hampered partly by the sharing of Kenya 
representation on the Authority but largely by the lack 
of central political direction. The various Ministerial 
committees and the Central Legislative Assembly, especia­
lly since it became properly representative have demons­
trated the need for such direction.
We are convinced that the time has now come to create 
such central political authority.
Having stated our aims we wish now to announce the
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steps we are taking to achieve the implementation of these 
aims.
A Working Party is being established which will pre­
pare a framework of a draft constitution for the Federation 
of East Africa. It will report back to a full Conference 
of East African Governments. In its work it will consult 
with the three Governments and with their consent may co­
opt constitutional or other experts. The E.A.C.S.O. will 
be associated with these deliberations.
In the third week of August a full scale Conference 
will be convened to consider the proposals of the Working 
Party.
At this point we must express our happiness at the 
victory of KANTJ in the Kenya elections. While welcoming 
the results of the Kenya elections, we must declare most 
strongly our opposition to any attempt to delay the coun­
try's achievement of Independence any longer. The ruling 
party has a clear mandate for Independence and we must 
regard it as an unfriendly act if Britain uses the pre­
text of some minority interest or other to prevent Kenya 
Joining the free nations at the earliest possible moment.
We are closely involved in this matter now since a hold­
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up in Kenya's advance to Independence will hinder the 
achievement of Federation to which we are committed. The 
three Governments, having agreed to the establishment of 
a Federation this year, expect the British Government to
Î’
grant Kenya's Independence immediately.
Although Zanzibar is not represented at this confe­
rence we must make it clear that that country is invited 
to participate fully in our plans for Federation.
As soon as Zanzibar has held its elections next 
month its Government will be invited to take part in the 
functioning of the Working Party and of any other body 
which may be set up as a result of our plans to build a 
Federation.
We reiterate that our plans for the Federation of 
East Africa are the logical promotion of the spirit of 
Pan-African unity and wish to make it, therefore, clear 
that any of our other neighbours may in future Join this 
Federation.
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APPENDIX II 
EAST AFRICA COMMON SERVICES
The general administration of services common to Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania by the East Africa High Commission 
in pre-independence days was taken over by the East Africa 
Common Services Organisation in 1962, Policy was control­
led by the Premiers of the three states sitting as the 
East Africa Common Services Authority, There were five 
committees of three Ministers, one from each territory, 
to control the five groups of services: Communications
(railways, harbours, posts and telecommunications, civil 
aviation and meteorology); Finance (income tax, customs 
and excise collection, and administration of the General 
Fund for the various services); Commercial and Industrial 
Co-ordination; Social and Research Sciences; Industrial 
Relations and Co-ordination of Labour, The Central Le­
gislative Assembly, responsible for passing the legisla­
tion for the administration of the common services, con­
sists of a Speaker, 15 Ministers (five from each state),
27 members (nine from each state and elected by their 
legislatures), and two official members (the Secretary- 
General and the Legal Secretary).
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On 6 June 1967 in Kampala, President Kenyatta (Kenya), 
President Obote (Uganda) and President Nyerere (Tanzania) 
signed a 15-year treaty of economic co-operation which 
came into force on 1 December 1967. Under the treaty, 
there will be an East Africa Development Bank, inter­
territorial tariffs on goods originating in one state and 
exported to another, replacement of the ministerial com­
mittees, decentralisation of E.A.C.S.O., and the organisa­
tion of an East Africa Economic Community of 25 million 
people.
The Development Bank will promote financial and tech­
nical assistance to industrial projects. Priority will be 
given to raising the industrial level of Uganda and Tanza­
nia on a par with Kenya. Each state will contribute an 
initial L2 million each and it is hoped to raise million 
overseas. The directors can call up a further BIO million 
over consecutive five-year periods. Tanzania and Uganda 
will each get 38-3/4 per cent of the Bank's total invest­
ment while Kenya will receive 22^ per cent.
A "transfer tax system" will allow a state that has 
8. trading deficit with its partners to impose transfer 
taxes on goods originating in these countries, up to the
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amount of the deficit, but only if similar goods are manu­
factured, or are expected to be, within three months in the 
tax-imposing country. The protected industry will also 
have a capacity to at least 15 per cent of domestic con­
sumption or to a value of BI00,000 whichever is the less. 
The tax will not exceed 50 per cent of the tariff on goods 
originating outside East Africa, nor can it be imposed for 
more than eight years. Its aim will be to favour Tanzania 
and allow her to compete freely with Kenya and Uganda with 
which she had trade deficits.
The ministerial committee system for E.A.C.S.O. will 
be replaced by a Minister for East Africa from each state, 
permanently based on E.A.C.S.O which will be moved from 
Nairobi to Arusha in northern Tanzania. The Development 
Bank and postal headquarters will be in Kampala; East 
African Railways and East African Airways in Nairobi; and 
the Harbour headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam.
The three Presidents will retain their authority as 
the controlling body of the East Africa Economic Community; 
a Common Market Council will handle the Community’s day-to- 
day affairs; and a tribunal will be created as a Judicial 
body. Provision will also be made for the association or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
133
active participation by Zambia, Burundi, Ethiopia and other 
interested countries in the East Africa Common Market.
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